When foreign governments weaponize cyber-operations, stolen data and coordinated disinformation campaigns to distort another country’s elections, the consequences are not hypothetical. Election meddling corrodes public trust, amplifies social divisions, and can tilt the political playing field in ways that linger for years. The United States has lived this reality since 2016: the Special Counsel’s investigation documented a widescale Russian operation to interfere in the presidential contest, and the political and legal disputes that followed only underscored how brittle democratic norms can be when targeted by a determined adversary.

That reality means allies must do more than issue rhetoric. NATO, the European Union and like-minded partners possess a menu of legal, diplomatic and economic tools that — when coordinated — can impose tangible costs on states that attack the integrity of democratic processes. This is not an argument for military intervention. Nor is it a call to strip sovereignty from any nation. It is a pragmatic, rules-based proposal: when a state weaponizes information and cyber operations to interfere with another country’s democratic process, democratic states should respond with enforceable, legal measures designed to deter, punish and remediate — and they should do so together.

What the record shows

Robert Mueller’s investigation produced two clear, connected findings: Russia mounted both a cyber-intrusion campaign to steal and selectively publish political materials and a parallel social-media influence operation designed to amplify discord and favor particular outcomes. The report and subsequent official summaries document numerous contacts between Russian intermediaries and U.S. campaign figures, and they catalog the operational reach of state-linked actors that sought to influence voters. Those are facts that should animate legal accountability and international cooperation, not excuses for inaction.

Allies already have acted — and can act more

Across Western democracies there is precedent for coordinated responses: targeted sanctions, coordinated diplomatic expulsions and joint attribution statements have been used to impose costs on Kremlin-linked operations in the past. U.S. Treasury and OFAC designations have penalized entities tied to election interference; allied states have expelled intelligence operatives in coordinated diplomatic gestures; and public attribution by security agencies has helped inoculate publics against false narratives. Those steps are necessary but insufficient if undertaken in isolation.

A practical five-part plan for lawful international pressure and accountability

1. Joint forensic attribution and legal fact-finding. Democratic governments and trusted international bodies should establish joint, independent forensic teams — staffed by national cyber response units and civilian technical experts — to investigate interference incidents and publish a shared factual record. NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and comparable national cyber centers can contribute technical capacity and standards for attribution and evidentiary handling. A public, jointly produced dossier reduces the ability of malefactors to sow doubt and provides a foundation for legal actions.
2. Coordinated targeted sanctions against responsible actors. When attribution is established, allies should rapidly coordinate targeted sanctions: asset freezes, visa bans, and restrictions against specific individuals, companies and state entities involved in operations. Coordinated measures, especially when implemented by the U.S., EU and other major economies, multiply the economic and reputational cost for perpetrators while minimizing collateral harm to civilians. Washington has used OFAC authorities to sanction entities tied to interference; allies should mirror and widen that firewall.
3. Mutual legal assistance and joint prosecutions where possible. States should use mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) and joint investigative mechanisms to gather cross-border evidence, pursue indictments for criminal actors (where domestic law permits), and deny safe harbor to operators behind malicious campaigns. Legal cooperation also makes it harder for offenders to hide behind complex corporate or offshore structures. Shared investigative channels build resilience and make prosecutions feasible without unilateral political escalation.
4. Rules, norms and capacity building for resilience. NATO and the EU should continue to develop binding cyber norms and operational playbooks for hybrid threats (disinformation, deepfakes, and influence operations). That means expanding technical assistance to election administrators, supporting independent journalism and civil-society fact-checking, and investing in public literacy campaigns to reduce vulnerability to manipulation. The Tallinn Manual process and NATO cyber work point the way toward normative frameworks; allies should convert those into operational assistance for vulnerable democracies.
5. Transparent, democratic oversight of responses. When governments invoke sanctions, legal mechanisms or public attributions, they must do so transparently and with legal safeguards. Democracies lose moral authority if their responses are perceived as secretive, politically selective, or unmoored from due process. Robust parliamentary or judicial oversight — and clear public explanations of the evidence and the legal basis for action — will strengthen both legitimacy and deterrence.

Objections and realpolitik

Critics will say international pressure invites tit-for-tat escalation or that attribution is always messy. Both are reasons to be measured and legalistic — not to abstain. A transparent, multilateral approach reduces the risk of miscalculation: coordinated attribution narrows disputes over facts, and targeted legal tools avoid the broad, indiscriminate costs that provoke escalation. And while legal thresholds for criminal charges vary across countries, civil and administrative measures (sanctions, exclusions from financial markets, and travel bans) provide immediate levers short of military or extra-legal coercion.

NATO and EU roles — complementary, not overlapping

NATO’s core mandate is collective defense; Article 5 remains reserved for armed attacks. But NATO also has critical cyber expertise and a political forum for consultations; its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre and allied cyber units are indispensable resources for technical attribution and resilience. The EU, for its part, has economic leverage and legal instruments for sanctions, and the Council of Europe and international criminal law institutions provide complementary legal channels. Delivered in concert, these instruments create a comprehensive — and lawful — response architecture.

Conclusion: accountability is a matter of democratic self-defense

Election interference is not an unavoidable cost of global competition; it is a cross-border crime against democracy. The appropriate response is not force, but law — and international cooperation. By synchronizing forensic attribution, coordinated sanctions, legal cooperation, resilience building and transparent oversight, NATO, the EU and democratic partners can raise the price of meddling and protect the integrity of elections at home and abroad. Democracies survive not through the brinksmanship of hard power, but through the disciplined, lawful use of the tools available to them — used together, publicly and with principles. That’s how you defend a polity worth living in.

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References

Mueller, R. S. (2019). Report on the investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. U.S. Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf

Council on Foreign Relations. (2021). Russian election interference, 2016–present. CFR Backgrounder. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russian-election-interference-2016-present

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (2022). Cyber defence. NATO Topics. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_78170.htm

Treasury Department. (2018, March 15). Treasury sanctions Russian cyber actors for interference with the 2016 U.S. elections and malicious cyber-attacks. U.S. Department of the Treasury. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312

NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. (2021). Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. Cambridge University Press.

European Union External Action Service. (2020). EU sanctions against cyber-attacks. EEAS Publications. https://www.eeas.europa.eu