By Cliff Potts, Chief Strategy Officer, Editor-in-Chief, WPS News

Publication Date: 10 January 2026

What happened Jan. 7–9 (PhST): fewer collisions, more positioning

Between January 7 and January 9 (PhST), the most consequential “incidents” in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea space were not a single headline-grabbing clash at sea, but a tightening pattern of posture + messaging: Manila put China’s sustained, coordinated presence back on the record, while Beijing answered with denial, inversion of blame, and narrative management.

On January 7, the Philippine side publicly amplified its assessment that Chinese operations have shifted toward more integrated and persistent activity—less “coast guard only,” more visibly coordinated across maritime instruments. The point wasn’t rhetorical. It is a warning about how quickly “routine presence” can become rapid, synchronized coercion when the switch is flipped.

By January 8, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) response hardened into a simple message: we are standing by documented facts—not vibes, not spin. The AFP framing matters because it treats the problem correctly: China’s pressure campaign isn’t occasional misbehavior; it’s a sustained system.

Beijing’s denial isn’t a rebuttal—it’s a tactic

China’s embassy response followed the familiar line: the Philippine “report” is biased, China is defensive, and the Philippines “provokes.” That’s not a refutation; it’s a reversal script designed to muddy the record and sap urgency.

When a state is serious about de-confliction, it prioritizes transparency, predictable communications, and operational restraint. When a state is serious about control, it prioritizes information dominance—including carefully timed “humanitarian” narratives that conveniently show up already packaged for publication. Philippine Coast Guard commentary in recent weeks has flagged this pattern bluntly: performative coordination, optimized for optics, not genuine cooperation.

Operational takeaway: the frontline is moving closer and getting more “joint”

The Philippine Navy assessment (as reported) describes a Chinese posture moving toward more consistent presence near the periphery of Philippine territory and EEZ, and more joint activity that tightens command-and-control between platforms. Translation: fewer improvisations, more rehearsed plays, and less warning time when Beijing decides to apply pressure.

This is where Manila has to stay unsentimental. The risk isn’t only ramming or water cannoning (those remain real). The bigger risk is the normalization of a Chinese operating environment where harassment becomes “background noise,” and the world shrugs.

Historical context that still governs the map—whether China likes it or not

Two legal anchors remain decisive:

  1. UNCLOS defines coastal-state rights in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
  2. The 2016 arbitral award (Philippines v. China) rejected the legal basis for China’s sweeping “historic rights” claims. China can ignore it politically, but it cannot erase it legally.

Manila reinforced this posture in domestic law with the Philippine Maritime Zones Act (RA 12064)—a quiet but important step because it reduces ambiguity and strengthens institutional continuity across administrations.

Bottom line

Jan. 7–9 was a reminder that the contest is not just ships and shoals—it’s the fight over what becomes “normal.” Manila is right to keep the record sharp and public. Beijing is counting on fatigue.

The Philippines should treat this as what it is: continuous pressure, not a series of isolated episodes—and respond with continuous documentation, continuous presence, and continuous alliance-level coordination.

For more social commentary, please see Occupy 2.5 at https://Occupy25.com

References (APA)

Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016, July 12). The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award. https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Award.pdf

Republic of the Philippines. (2024, November 7). Republic Act No. 12064 (Philippine Maritime Zones Act). https://lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2024/ra_12064_2024.html

United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V: Exclusive Economic Zone. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part5.htm

Ombay, G. (2026, January 6). PH Navy says China increased “coercive actions” in SCS; embassy denies. GMA News Online.

GMA News Online. (2025, December 31). PCG challenges China research ship off Cagayan province.

GMA News Online. (2026, January 3). PCG says China call seemed timed to boost narrative, not genuine coordination.

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