West Philippine Sea Situation Report (SITREP): March 28–April 4, 2026

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — April 6, 2026

Overview

The main pattern during this reporting period was continued Chinese pressure in the West Philippine Sea paired with Philippine efforts to hold position diplomatically, administratively, and operationally. The clearest developments were the resumption of Philippines-China bilateral consultations on March 28, Chinese naval-air-coast guard patrol activity around Bajo de Masinloc on March 29, the Philippine government’s decision to adopt local names for 131 features in the Kalayaan Island Group, and new Philippine military reporting that at least 90 unauthorized Chinese vessels were monitored in the West Philippine Sea during March.

The period did not produce one single dominant collision or water-cannon event in public reporting the way some earlier weeks did. Instead, it showed the continued normalization of gray-zone operations: persistent Chinese presence, Philippine diplomatic protest, and slow but visible Philippine efforts to reinforce sovereignty through naming, mapping, patrols, and civilian presence.

Diplomatic Developments

On March 28, Manila and Beijing resumed high-level talks under their bilateral consultation mechanism, the first such meeting since January 2025. Reuters reported that the Philippines used the meeting to reiterate its legal positions, raise concerns over incidents affecting Filipino personnel and fishermen, and emphasize diplomacy, communication, and adherence to international law, while both sides also discussed possible oil and gas cooperation and other bilateral issues.

Philippine reporting on March 29 said the Department of Foreign Affairs raised concerns directly with China over actions in the West Philippine Sea during the Fujian meeting. That matters because Manila continued its now-familiar dual-track posture: talk to Beijing, but do not back away from formal objections or legal framing.

Diplomatic friction also rose after President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. ordered the adoption and use of Philippine names for 131 features in the Kalayaan Island Group through Executive Order No. 111, issued March 26 and reported publicly during this period. Chinese officials objected to the move and warned of possible countermeasures, while Philippine coverage framed the order as a sovereignty and administrative-control measure tied to naming, mapping, and chart publication.

Maritime Activity (Surface)

The most important maritime indicator this week was scale rather than spectacle. GMA News, citing Armed Forces of the Philippines reporting on March 31, said at least 90 unauthorized Chinese vessels were monitored in the West Philippine Sea in March. The largest concentration was reported at Bajo de Masinloc with 49 vessels, followed by Pag-asa with 15, Ayungin Shoal with 14, and Escoda Shoal with 12.

On March 29, Reuters reported that China publicly announced naval, coast guard, and air patrols around Scarborough Shoal, known in the Philippines as Bajo de Masinloc. Beijing described the patrols as countermeasures to what it called provocative acts. From the Philippine perspective, the practical effect was the same as before: continued Chinese assertion inside an area that lies within the Philippine exclusive economic zone.

Philippine Navy reporting on April 1 denied claims that China had conducted military drills near Bajo de Masinloc, saying what was observed was not a formal exercise but a dispersed presence of Chinese coast guard, navy, and air assets. That distinction matters because it reinforces the Philippine view that China’s sustained presence is routine coercive pressure, not an isolated exceptional event.

Air Activity

Air activity during the period was tied mainly to the March 29 Chinese patrol announcement around Bajo de Masinloc, which explicitly included air assets along with naval and coast guard units. Public reporting reviewed for this week did not show a major new Philippine aircraft flare incident on the scale of the March 20 Mischief Reef episode from the prior reporting window, but it did show that the air domain remains part of China’s regular pressure pattern around disputed features.

The Philippine Navy’s April 1 statement also referred to a dispersed presence of Chinese Air Force elements near Bajo de Masinloc rather than a single formal drill. Taken together, that suggests continued aerial support to maritime assertion operations rather than a break in tempo.

Fisherfolk and Civilian Activity

Fisherfolk remained central to the operational picture. Reuters reported that Manila raised incidents threatening Filipino fishermen during the March 28 bilateral talks, which means civilian livelihood activity remained part of the official diplomatic agenda rather than a side issue.

Philippine transparency and media posts circulating during the period continued to show Philippine Coast Guard and BFAR deployments to support fishermen around Bajo de Masinloc. One report said Philippine vessels and aircraft were used to safeguard roughly 40 to 50 Filipino fishermen while documenting the presence of Chinese coast guard and other Chinese maritime forces in the area.

Civilian assertion also took a more symbolic form. Public reporting during the period continued to highlight Kalayaan town’s planned “patriotic tours” to Pag-asa Island, intended to bring Filipinos physically into the space rather than leave it as a remote abstraction. That is not a military development, but it is part of the sovereignty contest.

Security Incidents

No single collision or water-cannon attack dominated this reporting period in the public sources reviewed. The more important security story was persistence: dense Chinese vessel presence across multiple Philippine-claimed areas, Chinese multi-domain patrols around Bajo de Masinloc, and continuing Philippine condemnation of what it described as aggressive and dangerous conduct during March.

On April 2, reporting on a National Maritime Council statement said the Philippines strongly condemned repeated aggressive actions by the China Coast Guard, People’s Liberation Army Navy, and Chinese maritime militia during March. Even without a fresh collision that day, the government’s language made clear that Manila sees the month’s activity as a sustained security problem, not a string of isolated misunderstandings.

Weather and Sea Conditions

Weather conditions were generally workable for maritime operations. PAGASA’s weekly outlook, issued March 27 and valid through April 3, said easterlies would bring partly cloudy to cloudy skies across most of the country, with only isolated rainshowers or thunderstorms in many areas. From March 30 to April 1, a ridge of high pressure affected northern Luzon, while from April 2 to April 3 fair weather generally continued, except for brief afternoon or evening rainshowers or thunderstorms in the eastern sections of Visayas and Mindanao.

PAGASA also showed no gale warning in effect during the period. That matters because sea-state conditions do not appear to have been the main constraint on patrols, fishing, or maritime presence this week.

Seismic and Geophysical Activity

No West Philippine Sea seismic event appears to have directly altered operations during the reporting period. The most notable regional geophysical event was the April 1 magnitude 7.6 earthquake in Indonesia’s Northern Molucca Sea. Reuters reported that tsunami threats initially issued for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia were later lifted, while PHIVOLCS issued tsunami information stating there was no destructive tsunami threat to the Philippines and that the advisory was for information purposes only.

On that basis, geophysical activity was relevant as a temporary regional alerting issue, but it did not become an operational driver in the West Philippine Sea during this reporting window.

Assessment

This was a consolidation week, not a breakthrough week. China sustained its maritime pressure, publicly displayed multi-domain patrol activity around Bajo de Masinloc, and maintained broad unauthorized presence across multiple contested areas. The Philippines answered with diplomacy, public attribution, sovereignty signaling through naming and mapping, and continued support to fishermen and civilian presence.

The larger point is straightforward. The contest is no longer just about headline incidents. It is about whether constant Chinese presence becomes accepted as normal, and whether the Philippines can keep enough patrol, legal, administrative, and civilian activity in place to prevent that normalization from hardening into political fact. This week, Manila kept doing that work, but the burden remains heavy and continuous.

References

ABS-CBN News. (2026, March 21). Kalayaan town to launch “patriotic tours” to Pag-asa Island in April.

ABS-CBN News. (2026, March 29). PH raises concern over China’s actions in West PH Sea at Fujian meeting.

ABS-CBN News. (2026, March 31). Not an escalation: NSC says China activities in West PH Sea part of standard operations.

ABS-CBN News. (2026, March 31). 131 features of Kalayaan Island Group to have local names.

ABS-CBN News. (2026, April 1). China opposes Philippines renaming Kalayaan Island Group features.

GMA News Online. (2026, March 31). 90 unauthorized Chinese vessels spotted in WPS in March 2026 — AFP.

Manila Bulletin. (2026, April 2). PH strongly condemns repeated aggression by Chinese maritime forces in WPS in March.

PAGASA. (2026, March 27). Weekly weather outlook.

PAGASA. (2026, April 4). Gale warning.

PHIVOLCS. (2026, April 1). Tsunami Information No. 1.

Philippine News Agency. (2026, April 1). PH Navy denies China drills near Bajo de Masinloc.

Presidential Communications Office / reported via GMA News and ABS-CBN News. (2026, March 26/March 31). Executive Order No. 111 ordering the adoption of local names for 131 Kalayaan Island Group features.

Reuters. (2026, March 28). Manila, Beijing resume talks on South China Sea, energy security.

Reuters. (2026, March 29). China conducts patrol around disputed South China Sea shoal.

Reuters. (2026, April 1). Indonesia earthquake damages buildings, but tsunami alerts have been lifted.

WPS Transparency Office / related Philippine Coast Guard-linked reporting. (2026, March-April). PCG and BFAR deployments supporting Filipino fishermen in Bajo de Masinloc.

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