Bad Faith, Documented

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News
Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — February 17, 2026

Why This Series Exists

This series documents bad-faith business dealings connected to Chinese state-backed lenders, state-owned enterprises, and state-linked commercial actors operating overseas.

The purpose of publishing this work on a fixed schedule is straightforward: bad faith thrives when cases are isolated, forgotten, or dismissed as political noise. A documented record allows patterns to emerge. A documented record also allows corrections.

This is not an ideological project. It is a documentation project. Where evidence does not support a claim, that will be stated clearly. Where evidence is incomplete, that will be stated just as plainly.

What “Bad Faith” Means Here

In this series, “bad faith” is not a rhetorical label. It refers to documentable practices that predictably undermine transparency, accountability, or fair enforcement.

A deal qualifies as “bad faith” in this series if credible public sources support one or more of the following:

• Contract secrecy that blocks oversight, including restrictions preventing disclosure of material terms to legislatures, auditors, or the public
• Asymmetric enforcement terms, where remedies and penalties disproportionately favor the lender or contractor
• Hidden or hard-to-track liabilities that weaken debt management and fiscal planning
• Risk dumping, in which downside risk is structured to fall on host governments or populations regardless of performance
• Political leverage exercised through commercial channels, where economic pressure does not align with normal market behavior

This definition excludes routine project failure, bureaucratic incompetence, and local corruption unrelated to contract design.

How WPS News Will Prove Claims

Each essay in this series will apply the same evidentiary framework:

1. What is being claimed
2. What documentation exists (contracts, audits, filings, legislative records, official disclosures)
3. What the terms actually do (enforcement rights, penalties, renegotiation constraints)
4. What occurred after signing (delays, cost overruns, refinancing, disputes)
5. Who bore the risk and cost
6. What remains uncertain or undisclosed

When contracts are not public, that fact will be stated explicitly. Analysis will rely on official disclosures, audit language, court filings, reputable datasets, and established investigative reporting, with confidence levels clearly indicated.

Why This Matters for the Philippines

This reporting is Philippines-first because the consequences are tangible.

Opaque financing and one-sided enforcement terms can affect:

• ports and logistics
• energy generation and grid resilience
• telecommunications and data infrastructure
• public debt sustainability
• policy independence during diplomatic pressure

Deals that appear viable at signing can become constraints years later, when exchange rates shift, disasters strike, or refinancing costs rise.

What Public Research Already Shows

A growing body of public research indicates that some Chinese overseas lending contracts include unusual confidentiality provisions and other clauses that reduce transparency and constrain borrower flexibility.

Separately, international financial institutions have warned that hidden debt and weak disclosure laws damage economies and complicate restructuring—regardless of creditor nationality.

This evidence does not condemn every project. It does justify systematic, case-by-case examination.

What Comes Next

The next article in this series will examine a single overseas case, using the same checklist applied here.

Each future entry will focus on one deal, one pattern, or one documented mechanism. No aggregation without evidence. No country pile-ons. Just records that can be checked later.

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For more social commentary, please see Occupy 2.5 at https://Occupy25.com

This essay will be archived as part of the ongoing WPS News Monthly Brief Series available through Amazon.

References (APA)

Ashcroft, A., Vasquez, K., & Weeks-Brown, R. (2024). Hidden debt hurts economies: Better disclosure laws can help ease the pain. International Monetary Fund.

Gelpern, A., Haddad, O., Horn, S., Kintzinger, P., Parks, B. C., & Trebesch, C. (2025). How China lends 2.0: Introducing an extended dataset of sovereign debt contracts. AidData at William & Mary.

Maslen, S., Raja, S., & Atamanov, A. (2022). Enhancing debt transparency by strengthening public debt legal frameworks. World Bank.

Parks, B. C., Gelpern, A., Trebesch, C., Horn, S., Reinhart, C. M., & Wells, J. (2021). How China lends: A rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments. AidData at William & Mary.