By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News
Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — January 30, 2026

In public memory, political crises in the United States are often treated as aberrations—moments when the system briefly faltered before correcting itself. Yet when examined across the past sixty-eight years, these episodes form a consistent historical pattern rather than a series of exceptions.

From the late 1950s to the present, successive U.S. administrations have repeatedly relied on secrecy, fear, and institutional impunity to manage dissent, justify violence, and shield officials from accountability. This continuity cuts across party lines and ideological branding. What changes are the justifications. What remains constant is the structure.

The Cold War Foundation (1957–1968)

By the late 1950s, the national-security apparatus had become a permanent feature of American governance. Intelligence agencies operated with minimal oversight, foreign interventions were conducted covertly, and domestic dissent was increasingly framed as a security threat rather than a political disagreement.

The Red Scare normalized the idea that accusation alone could destroy reputations. Loyalty replaced legality as the standard. Although Joseph McCarthy himself eventually fell, the damage was institutional: fear proved effective, and the method endured.

The Vietnam War marked the first large-scale exposure of this structure to public view. Official narratives consistently misrepresented progress, necessity, and scope. The Gulf of Tonkin incident—later revealed to be fabricated—served as a pretext for massive escalation. Accountability never followed.

Domestic Force and the Collapse of Trust (1968–1974)

By 1968, the consequences of this system became visible at home. Protest movements were met with surveillance, infiltration, and force. The killing of unarmed students at Kent State in 1970—and the failure to convict any responsible party—sent a clear institutional message: state violence against civilians would not be meaningfully punished.

The Watergate scandal briefly suggested that the system might correct itself. Richard Nixon resigned, but the lesson absorbed by future administrations was not restraint—it was discretion. Pardons, limited prosecutions, and institutional self-protection ensured that consequences remained narrow and survivable.

Normalization Through Management (1975–1988)

The post-Watergate era replaced overt scandal with managed governance. Intelligence abuses were acknowledged but not dismantled. Oversight mechanisms were created, then gradually weakened.

Under Ronald Reagan, covert action returned as policy. The Iran-Contra affair demonstrated that illegal operations could be conducted, exposed, and ultimately survived with minimal damage to the governing coalition. Economic policy shifted decisively toward deregulation and wealth concentration under the promise of “trickle-down” benefits—claims that would later prove unfounded but politically durable.

Scandal Without Consequence (1989–2000)

The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union as a unifying external threat, but not the structures built to oppose it. Military interventions continued under humanitarian or stability justifications. Domestically, politics became increasingly theatrical.

The Clinton administration demonstrated a different form of impunity: personal misconduct overshadowed structural issues, while substantive economic deregulation—particularly in finance and media—proceeded with bipartisan support. Investigations consumed years and attention, yet produced no systemic reform.

Permanent War and Manufactured Consent (2001–2008)

The attacks of September 11, 2001, did not create a new system—they activated an existing one at full scale. Intelligence failures were acknowledged but never meaningfully punished. The invasion of Afghanistan began with public support; the invasion of Iraq followed on demonstrably false claims regarding weapons of mass destruction.

No senior officials were prosecuted for these deceptions. Torture was rebranded as “enhanced interrogation.” Surveillance expanded domestically. The precedent was clear: catastrophic error, even when intentional, carried no personal consequence.

Drift, Decline, and Disillusionment (2009–2016)

The Obama administration inherited permanent war and expanded executive power—and largely preserved both. Financial crimes that triggered the 2008 collapse went unpunished at the executive level. Public faith in accountability continued to erode.

The failure to materially improve economic conditions for large segments of the population created fertile ground for political backlash. Institutions remained intact; trust did not.

Open Corrosion (2017–2026)

The Trump era did not introduce corruption—it made it explicit. Norms previously enforced informally were discarded. Federal agencies became instruments of loyalty rather than law. Immigration enforcement increasingly blurred into paramilitary action.

The re-election of Trump following years of institutional paralysis reflected not a sudden shift in values, but the exhaustion of public confidence. When accountability is absent for decades, outrage eventually becomes resignation—or radicalization.

Recent incidents involving lethal force by federal agents, followed by narrative management rather than transparent investigation, fit squarely within this historical pattern.

Conclusion

Across sixty-nine years, the United States has demonstrated remarkable continuity in how power is exercised and protected. Scandals erupt, officials rotate, parties alternate—but the underlying system persists.

This is not a story of collapse. It is a record of design functioning as intended.

History does not ask whether this trajectory is moral. It asks whether it is sustainable.

For more social commentary, please see Occupy 2.5 at https://Occupy25.com

This essay will be archived as part of the ongoing WPS News Monthly Brief Series, available through Amazon.

References (APA)

Church Committee. (1976). Intelligence activities and the rights of Americans. U.S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

Ellsberg, D. (1971). Papers on the war in Vietnam (The Pentagon Papers). The New York Times.

Hersh, S. M. (1983). The price of power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Summit Books.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. (2004). The 9/11 Commission Report. U.S. Government Printing Office.

U.S. Department of Defense. (2005). Investigation into detainee abuse. Office of the Inspector General.

Woodward, B., & Bernstein, C. (1974). All the President’s Men. Simon & Schuster.

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