Gray-Zone Power and the Cost of Ambiguity

灰色地带力量与模糊策略的代价

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — October 30, 2026 — 17:35

China has found a way to apply pressure without crossing fully into open war.

That is what gray-zone power is for.

It is pressure calibrated to stay below the threshold that would trigger a full military response, while still changing facts on the water, in the air, and in the political calculations of everyone nearby. Analysts at CSIS describe Beijing’s South China Sea approach in exactly those terms: coercion and threats of force, but with a continued unwillingness to be the first to use lethal military force, keeping disputes in the “grey zone” instead.

What Gray-Zone Power Looks Like

Gray-zone tactics are not mysterious.

They rely on repetition, proximity, and ambiguity. Coast guard ships, maritime militia vessels, survey operations, blocking maneuvers, pressure on resupply missions, and constant presence at contested features all serve the same purpose: to make resistance costly while keeping escalation controlled. A 2025 CSIS testimony on China’s South China Sea activities argues that Beijing believes pressure and non-lethal force can eventually compel Southeast Asian states to acquiesce.

This works precisely because it is hard to answer cleanly.

If another country responds too weakly, China gains ground. If it responds too strongly, it risks being blamed for escalation. That is the trap.

The Maritime Militia Problem

One of the most effective tools in this system is China’s maritime militia.

AMTI reported in February 2026 that satellite imagery showed China’s maritime militia deployed in record-high numbers across the South China Sea in 2025, with a daily average of 241 militia vessels, the highest level AMTI has measured in any year. The same report described the militia as the largest fleet of ships operating in the South China Sea.

The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2024 report adds important detail. It says at least part of the PRC fishing fleet in disputed waters is affiliated with known traditional maritime militia units, and that since 2014 China has built a Spratly backbone fleet of at least 235 large steel-hulled fishing vessels. It also says the Sansha City Maritime Militia includes purpose-built vessels equipped with water cannons and reinforced hulls for ramming.

That is not normal civilian activity.

It is organized state-backed pressure wearing a blurred civilian face.

Why Ambiguity Matters

Ambiguity is not accidental in this system. It is functional.

If China used only naval warships, its actions would look more openly military. If it relied only on diplomats, it would not produce enough pressure. The gray-zone approach sits in between. It mixes legal claims, administrative language, coast guard operations, and militia activity so that every individual move can be described as limited, defensive, or routine even when the cumulative effect is plainly coercive. CSIS notes that from 2012 to 2021 these gray-zone tactics were “remarkably successful,” driving Southeast Asian fishers from traditional grounds, helping halt foreign energy projects off Vietnam, and limiting other states’ ability to enforce their own laws inside their exclusive economic zones.

That history matters because it explains why the region no longer treats these incidents as isolated.

They are read as a method.

The Regional Cost

The cost of ambiguity is not only tactical. It is political.

The ISEAS State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey found that “aggressive behaviour in the South China Sea” was a top geopolitical concern across ASEAN respondents, with especially high concern in the Philippines and Vietnam. The same survey found that among respondents who distrust China, 47.6% believe China’s economic and military power threatens their countries’ interests and sovereignty; in the Philippines that figure was 69.9%, and in Vietnam it was 53.2%.

That is what gray-zone pressure buys in the long run.

Not reassurance. Not quiet acceptance. Persistent suspicion.

Taiwan and the Wider Signal

Taiwan sharpens the problem because it demonstrates how gray-zone tactics can be scaled.

CFR’s March 2026 backgrounder says Taiwan remains the likeliest potential flash point in U.S.-China relations and notes that Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei, including a major December 2025 war game around the island.

That matters even for countries not directly involved in cross-strait politics.

Regional governments watch how China uses pressure where it believes history and sovereignty are on its side. They then ask the obvious question: if this is how Beijing behaves in one unresolved dispute, why would others assume restraint elsewhere?

Why This Strategy Backfires

Gray-zone power can generate tactical gains.

It can complicate resupply, increase operational costs for smaller states, and steadily normalize Chinese presence in disputed areas. But it also creates a broader strategic effect that works against China’s larger goals.

Countries respond by hedging, building outside partnerships, expanding defense ties, and treating Chinese intentions as something to manage rather than trust. The more successful gray-zone coercion appears in the short term, the more it hardens balancing behavior over time. That is not a public-relations failure. It is a consequence of method.

The Bottom Line

Gray-zone power is attractive because it looks cheaper than war.

But ambiguity has a price.

It creates room for pressure in the moment while destroying confidence over time. China may believe that staying below the threshold of open conflict makes its behavior more acceptable. In practice, it often makes its behavior look more calculated, more persistent, and harder to trust.

That is the real cost of ambiguity.

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This essay is written by Cliff Potts, Editor-in-Chief of WPS News. WPS News has been active in one form or another on the internet since 2009; for more information, visit https://cliffpotts.org.

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If this work helps you understand what’s happening, help me keep it going: https://www.patreon.com/cw/WPSNews

References

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (2026, February 23). All together now: China’s militia in 2025.

Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, March 13). Taiwan explained: Why China claims it, and why the U.S. is involved.

Poling, G. B. (2025, March 20). China’s grey zone predations in the South China Sea [Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission].

U.S. Department of Defense. (2024, December 18). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China 2024.

Seah, S., Lin, J., Martinus, M., Fong, K., Pham, T. P. T., & Aridati, I. Z. (2025). The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 survey report.