West Philippine Sea Situation Report (SITREP): July 18–25, 2026

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — July 26, 2026

Overview

The reporting period was marked by sustained Chinese pressure at two separate Philippine-held or Philippine-accessed locations in the West Philippine Sea: Ayungin Shoal and Bajo de Masinloc. China Coast Guard personnel physically confronted Philippine Navy personnel near Ayungin on July 20, followed by water-cannon operations and dangerous maneuvering against Philippine government fisheries vessels near Bajo de Masinloc on July 23 and 24.

These were not isolated departures from previous Chinese conduct. They reflected the continuing normalization of gray-zone operations involving coast guard vessels, small boats, physical obstruction, water cannons, close approaches, competing public statements, and immediate diplomatic pressure. Philippine forces continued operating without using lethal force or abandoning their lawful missions.

The Philippines, the United States, Japan, China, and ASEAN governments also conducted high-level diplomacy or security activities during the period. Weather conditions deteriorated late in the reporting window as Tropical Cyclone Kiyapo crossed northern Luzon and moved into the West Philippine Sea, strengthening the southwest monsoon and affecting navigation.

Diplomatic Developments

The Philippines and China summoned each other’s ambassadors on July 21 following the confrontation at Ayungin Shoal. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. summoned Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan, while China’s Foreign Ministry summoned the Philippine ambassador in Beijing. Publicly reported ambassadorial summonses have remained relatively uncommon despite frequent encounters at sea, indicating that both governments treated the July 20 incident as diplomatically serious (Reuters, 2026a).

Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro met Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Manila on July 22 during ASEAN-related meetings. Lazaro delivered a strong protest over what she called unacceptable actions against Filipino personnel. Wang delivered China’s counterprotest, accused Philippine personnel of ramming Chinese vessels, and said bilateral relations were at a crossroads. Both sides nevertheless discussed keeping communication channels open and finding practical means of managing tensions (Reuters, 2026b).

The Philippine government also clarified that existing arrangements concerning missions to the BRP Sierra Madre do not recognize Chinese jurisdiction and do not require Manila to obtain Beijing’s permission before conducting Philippine resupply activities at Ayungin Shoal (Reuters, 2026c).

ASEAN foreign ministers discussed recent South China Sea incidents during meetings hosted by the Philippines. Their joint communication noted concern about serious incidents, activities that endangered personnel, land reclamation, and environmental damage. ASEAN governments and China reported progress toward a proposed Code of Conduct and maintained a stated objective of completing negotiations during 2026 (Associated Press, 2026a).

United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio described China’s actions as disturbing and reaffirmed that Washington would not abandon its Philippine ally. The U.S. State Department characterized Chinese conduct as dangerous and provocative. Rubio also discussed the incidents during a meeting with Wang Yi in Manila (Reuters, 2026c; Reuters, 2026d).

Maritime Activity (Surface)

On July 20, a China Coast Guard rigid-hull or inflatable boat carrying eight personnel approached the BRP Sierra Madre at close range and maneuvered around the grounded Philippine outpost while taking photographs and video. Philippine Navy personnel deployed in two small rubber boats and asked the Chinese boat to move away (Associated Press, 2026b).

The encounter developed into a physical confrontation. Philippine authorities reported that Chinese personnel struck at least one Filipino sailor on the head with a wooden baton and damaged a Philippine Navy rubber boat. Later Associated Press reporting indicated that two Filipino personnel were injured by wooden poles during the encounter. China claimed the Philippine boats had rammed its patrol craft and that Philippine personnel used oars or sticks against Chinese personnel (Associated Press, 2026a, 2026b).

On July 23, China Coast Guard units intercepted two Philippine fisheries vessels operating near Bajo de Masinloc. A Chinese vessel fired a water cannon toward one of the vessels for more than two minutes. Philippine reporting described the strike as indirect or nearly hitting the fisheries vessel. China said it tracked, intercepted, and drove away the Philippine vessels after they allegedly ignored warnings (Reuters, 2026c).

Chinese vessels again used water cannons against Philippine fisheries vessels on July 24. The Philippine Coast Guard reported that Chinese forces included 12 China Coast Guard ships and three vessels assessed as Chinese maritime militia. China stated that it had warned, blocked, and used water cannons against Philippine government and fishing vessels that it accused of gathering illegally around the shoal (Reuters, 2026e; Al Jazeera, 2026).

During the July 24 operation, a China Coast Guard vessel approached the BFAR ship BRP Datux Paduhinog to within approximately seven meters. The Philippine Coast Guard described the maneuver as reckless and said it created a serious collision risk (Associated Press, 2026a).

From July 21 through July 25, the Philippines conducted five days of maritime exercises with the United States and Japan in the South China Sea. The activity involved naval vessels, coast guard vessels, surveillance aircraft, and fighter aircraft. The Armed Forces of the Philippines said the exercises were intended to improve interoperability. Exact operating locations were not publicly disclosed during the reporting period (Reuters, 2026f).

On July 25, newly installed Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff Gen. Antonio Nafarrete visited Pag-asa Island. He told personnel stationed there that they played a central role in protecting the Philippine outpost and pledged support for improving their operational capabilities (Reuters, 2026f).

Air Activity

The Philippine-United States-Japan exercises conducted from July 21 through July 25 included surveillance and fighter aircraft. Public statements did not identify aircraft types, detailed flight routes, patrol altitudes, or specific encounters with Chinese aircraft (Reuters, 2026f).

No independently confirmed Chinese aerial intercept, flare deployment, radar lock, or unsafe air approach involving a Philippine aircraft was publicly documented within the defined reporting window.

China announced a combined naval and air patrol in the South China Sea on July 26, after the SITREP cutoff. Because the Chinese announcement fell outside the reporting period, that patrol is not counted as an event between July 18 at 00:01 and July 25 at 23:59.

Fisherfolk and Civilian Activity

Philippine government operations near Bajo de Masinloc involved BFAR vessels supporting fishing activity in waters traditionally used by Filipino fisherfolk. China claimed that Philippine authorities had organized government vessels, coast guard ships, and a large number of fishing vessels to gather around the shoal (Reuters, 2026e).

The Philippine Coast Guard rejected China’s attempt to restrict access. It stated that Bajo de Masinloc was a traditional Filipino fishing ground and that Filipino fishing rights could not lawfully be blocked by a foreign power. The 2016 arbitral award found that China had unlawfully prevented traditional fishing at the shoal, although questions of territorial sovereignty over the feature itself were not decided by the tribunal (Reuters, 2026e).

The presence of Philippine fisheries vessels and civilian fishing boats amid a larger Chinese coast guard formation demonstrated the continuing problem facing fisherfolk: legal fishing access exists, but practical access remains subject to Chinese interception, surveillance, obstruction, and the threat or use of force.

No confirmed civilian deaths, vessel sinkings, or detentions of Filipino fisherfolk were reported during the period.

Security Incidents

The most serious personnel-related incident occurred at Ayungin Shoal on July 20. Chinese personnel used wooden batons or poles during a close-range encounter between small boats, resulting in head injuries to Philippine Navy personnel and damage to a Philippine rubber boat. Philippine officials said their personnel exercised restraint and did not take actions intended to widen the confrontation (Associated Press, 2026b).

China maintained that Philippine boats rammed its craft and that Filipino personnel initiated attacks with oars or sticks. The Philippine and Chinese accounts therefore remained directly opposed. Available video supported the finding that Chinese and Philippine personnel came into physical contact and that Chinese personnel struck toward the Philippine boat, but it did not resolve every claim made by either government.

At Bajo de Masinloc, China Coast Guard vessels used water cannons on two successive days. The July 24 approach to within seven meters of BRP Datux Paduhinog presented an immediate collision hazard. No collision, grounding, boarding, firearms discharge, or confirmed radar targeting was reported there during the period (Associated Press, 2026a; Reuters, 2026e).

The use of small craft and non-firearm weapons at Ayungin, followed by coast guard water cannons at Bajo de Masinloc, allowed China to apply physical pressure while keeping the confrontations below the normal threshold of conventional armed conflict.

Weather and Sea Conditions

Tropical Depression Kiyapo developed east of southeastern Luzon late on July 22. PAGASA initially reported maximum sustained winds of 45 kilometers per hour and forecast a west-northwestward path toward extreme northern Luzon and the Luzon Strait (PAGASA, 2026a).

By July 24, Kiyapo had strengthened into a tropical storm as it approached Cagayan and the Babuyan Islands. At 10:00 a.m., PAGASA placed its center approximately 135 kilometers east of Aparri, Cagayan, with maximum sustained winds of 75 kilometers per hour and gusts of up to 90 kilometers per hour (PAGASA, 2026b).

PAGASA warned that the cyclone and southwest monsoon would produce strong to gale-force gusts across much of the country. Very rough seas of up to 5.5 meters were forecast around Batanes and the Babuyan Islands, while rough or moderate-to-rough conditions affected other Philippine seaboards. PAGASA also projected that Kiyapo could intensify rapidly after entering the West Philippine Sea (PAGASA, 2026c).

The southwest monsoon produced heavy rain across portions of western Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao. PAGASA’s July 22 advisory forecast substantial monsoon rainfall in Antique, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, parts of Zamboanga, Lanao, Maguindanao, Occidental Mindoro, Iloilo, Guimaras, and other western provinces through July 25 (PAGASA, 2026d).

Kiyapo’s main track was north of Bajo de Masinloc and the Spratly Islands. However, stronger southwest flow, reduced visibility, higher waves, and widespread rainfall could affect Philippine civilian and government navigation, especially by smaller vessels. Weather did not prevent the reported July 23 and 24 Philippine operations near Bajo de Masinloc.

Seismic and Geophysical Activity

PHIVOLCS recorded routine seismic activity in and around the Philippines during the reporting period. No significant earthquake, volcanic event, tsunami threat, submarine landslide, or other geophysical event was identified as materially affecting West Philippine Sea operations between July 18 and July 25.

A magnitude 4.1 tectonic earthquake was recorded on July 20, but PHIVOLCS indicated that damaging effects and aftershocks were not expected. It had no identified operational relationship to the maritime incidents covered in this report (PHIVOLCS, 2026).

Assessment

Chinese gray-zone pressure remained sustained and geographically distributed. The sequence moved from direct personnel confrontation at Ayungin Shoal to coast guard water-cannon operations at Bajo de Masinloc. This demonstrated China’s ability to vary its methods while maintaining the same basic objective: controlling Philippine movement and making lawful access costly, hazardous, and politically difficult.

The events should not be treated as a wholly new escalation cycle. Batons, small-boat interception, water cannons, blocking formations, close approaches, surveillance, legal claims, and diplomatic counteraccusations are now established parts of China’s operating pattern. What changed during this reporting period was the concentration of several serious incidents within five days and at two separate locations.

Philippine operations continued despite Chinese interference. The Philippine Navy maintained the Ayungin outpost, while the PCG and BFAR continued missions near Bajo de Masinloc. Philippine forces did not respond with firearms or other lethal measures. This preserved Manila’s position that it was exercising lawful rights rather than seeking an armed confrontation.

The simultaneous ASEAN meetings produced renewed support for communication and a Code of Conduct, but diplomacy did not prevent coercive operations at sea. The water-cannon incidents occurred while senior Chinese, Philippine, American, and ASEAN officials were meeting in Manila. Dialogue and maritime pressure therefore continued in parallel rather than replacing one another.

Weather became a larger operational factor near the end of the period. Kiyapo and the southwest monsoon raised risks for small craft and civilian fishing operations. Poor conditions can reduce Philippine maritime presence more severely than they affect larger Chinese ships, giving China an additional practical advantage even without changing its deployed force.

References

Al Jazeera. (2026, July 24). Philippines accuses China of using water cannon on vessels for second day.

Associated Press. (2026a, July 24). China forces fire water cannon at Philippine ships in third faceoff this week in South China Sea.

Associated Press. (2026b, July 20). Philippines accuses Chinese coast guard of injuring Filipino sailor in disputed shoal.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026a, July 22). Tropical cyclone bulletin no. 1: Tropical Depression Kiyapo.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026b, July 24). Tropical cyclone bulletin no. 10: Tropical Storm Kiyapo.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026c, July 24). Tropical cyclone bulletin no. 7: Tropical Depression Kiyapo.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026d, July 22). Weather advisory no. 7: Tropical Cyclone Kiyapo and southwest monsoon.

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. (2026, July 20). Earthquake information: Magnitude 4.1 tectonic earthquake.

Reuters. (2026a, July 21). Philippines, China summon each other’s envoys over South China Sea incident.

Reuters. (2026b, July 22). Philippine, Chinese foreign ministers trade protests over South China Sea encounter.

Reuters. (2026c, July 23). Rubio says China’s actions in the South China Sea are “disturbing.”

Reuters. (2026d, July 22). Rubio meets Wang, discusses laying groundwork for Chinese president’s U.S. visit.

Reuters. (2026e, July 24). Philippines accuses China of using water cannon on its vessels for a second day.

Reuters. (2026f, July 26). U.S., Japan join Philippines in South China Sea drills.

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