West Philippine Sea Situation Report (SITREP): July 24–August 7, 2026

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — August 8, 2026

Overview

From 00:01 Philippine Standard Time on July 24 through 20:00 on August 7, 2026, the West Philippine Sea remained under sustained Chinese maritime and military pressure, particularly around Bajo de Masinloc, or Scarborough Shoal.

The reporting period began with direct China Coast Guard action against Philippine Coast Guard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessels supporting Filipino fisherfolk near Bajo de Masinloc. On July 24, Chinese vessels used water cannons and conducted close maneuvers against Philippine government ships. One China Coast Guard vessel approached to within approximately seven meters of a BFAR vessel, creating a serious collision risk. Philippine vessels continued their mission and no Filipino casualties were reported from the July 24 encounters (Philippine News Agency [PNA], 2026a; Reuters, 2026a).

By August 1, China had shifted the visible emphasis around Bajo de Masinloc toward combined military and law-enforcement operations. Chinese state media reported joint naval and air combat patrols by the People’s Liberation Army and China Coast Guard around the shoal, accompanied by a China Coast Guard law-enforcement exercise and an announced policy of stronger patrols and control measures around China’s claimed nature reserve there (Reuters, 2026b).

These events fit an established pattern rather than representing an isolated new escalation. China continued to combine coast guard enforcement, naval and air activity, administrative rules, legal claims and physical pressure against Philippine operations. The Philippine response remained based on continued presence, support for Filipino fisherfolk, maritime monitoring, diplomacy and international security partnerships.

Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic activity during the reporting period continued on several tracks.

On July 24, regional diplomatic meetings in Manila brought together ASEAN foreign ministers and major external partners, including China and the United States. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly described Chinese conduct in the South China Sea as disturbing and reaffirmed American support for its Philippine treaty ally. The same day, Beijing defended China Coast Guard actions near Bajo de Masinloc as lawful and accused the Philippines of provocation (Reuters, 2026a).

Philippine officials continued supporting negotiations for a South China Sea Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China. Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro said there was political will to complete the agreement, although the effectiveness of any final code will depend on its provisions, implementation and consistency with international law (ABS-CBN News, 2026).

The European Union also deepened security cooperation with Manila. On July 24, EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. welcomed a €15 million European Peace Facility assistance measure for the Philippines. The program is intended to strengthen Armed Forces of the Philippines maritime-domain-awareness capabilities, including detection, monitoring, analysis, early warning and coordination among maritime security forces (European External Action Service [EEAS], 2026).

On July 29, the AFP publicly welcomed the assistance and said it would improve Philippine ability to monitor maritime activity and protect national maritime interests (PNA, 2026b).

The Philippines also took an additional legal and cartographic step concerning Bajo de Masinloc. Public reporting on July 31 and August 1 said the Department of Foreign Affairs had deposited an official Philippine nautical chart of Bajo de Masinloc with the United Nations Secretariat, formally notifying the international community of the baselines and geographic extent asserted by the Philippines under its maritime-zone legislation. The action reinforced Manila’s strategy of combining physical presence with legal documentation of Philippine sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.

On August 3, U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Samuel Paparo warned publicly against coercion and attempts by any state to dominate the Indo-Pacific. Philippine Defense Secretary Teodoro, speaking in the same regional security context, said the Philippines would continue resisting Chinese pressure. ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn said negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct had advanced and expressed confidence that an agreement could be completed during 2026 (Associated Press, 2026).

Maritime Activity (Surface)

The most significant documented Philippine surface operation inside the reporting period occurred on July 24 near Bajo de Masinloc.

At approximately 6:26 a.m., China Coast Guard vessel 3107 fired a water cannon toward BRP Cape San Agustin while the Philippine Coast Guard vessel was operating approximately 15 nautical miles northeast of the shoal. Philippine authorities reported that at least six China Coast Guard and Chinese maritime militia vessels were shadowing the mission area (PNA, 2026a).

At approximately 7:35 a.m., China Coast Guard vessel 21581 maneuvered near the BFAR vessel BRP Datu Paduhinog. According to Philippine reporting, the Chinese ship closed to approximately seven meters from the Philippine vessel’s port bow. Water cannon fire subsequently struck the Philippine vessel directly. Additional water-cannon strikes were reported shortly afterward (PNA, 2026a).

The Philippine Coast Guard said its personnel remained safe and that the PCG-BFAR operation continued.

China presented a different account. The China Coast Guard said Philippine government ships and fishing vessels had entered waters Beijing considers Chinese territorial waters and said it used warnings, blocking measures and water cannon fire to remove them. China continued to reject Philippine maritime claims at Bajo de Masinloc and the 2016 arbitral ruling underlying Manila’s position (Xinhua, 2026; Reuters, 2026a).

On August 1, Chinese operations around Bajo de Masinloc expanded into publicly announced joint military activity. The People’s Liberation Army and China Coast Guard conducted naval and air combat patrols around the shoal. China Coast Guard forces separately conducted what Beijing described as a rights-protection and law-enforcement exercise (Reuters, 2026b).

China also announced that Coast Guard patrols around its claimed Huangyan Island National Nature Reserve would become regular and that enforcement and control measures would be strengthened. The Philippines does not recognize China’s authority to impose such controls on Filipino activity at Bajo de Masinloc.

No independently confirmed major Philippine Navy surface confrontation after the July 24 Bajo de Masinloc operation was identified in credible public reporting reviewed through 20:00 on August 7.

Air Activity

The main confirmed air development during the reporting period came from China.

On August 1, the People’s Liberation Army conducted joint air and naval combat activity in the airspace and waters surrounding Bajo de Masinloc. Chinese authorities described the operation as a test of combat readiness and the ability to defend China’s claimed sovereignty and maritime rights (Reuters, 2026b).

The use of military aircraft in combination with naval and coast guard forces is significant because it places multiple Chinese services into the same operating area. It also expands Beijing’s ability to maintain surveillance and pressure beyond surface-vessel operations alone.

No credible public report reviewed for this SITREP established a new Chinese flare deployment, dangerous air intercept or direct aerial confrontation involving a Philippine aircraft between July 24 at 00:01 and August 7 at 20:00. Absence of public reporting does not establish absence of routine surveillance or warning activity; it means no qualifying incident was confirmed for inclusion here.

Fisherfolk and Civilian Activity

Philippine government operations at Bajo de Masinloc remained closely connected to the protection and support of Filipino fisherfolk.

The July 24 PCG-BFAR mission formed part of the Kadiwa ng Bagong Bayaning Mangingisda program, which provides fuel and other support to fishermen operating in traditional fishing areas. Chinese coast guard pressure did not stop Philippine vessels from continuing the mission (PNA, 2026a).

Chinese activity nevertheless continues to affect practical access to fishing grounds. Filipino fishermen have repeatedly reported being driven away, blocked or pressured near Bajo de Masinloc. Reuters reported in July that some fishermen from Zambales have reduced or abandoned operations near the shoal because of Chinese interference and the economic risk involved (Reuters, 2026c).

On August 1, China announced regulations associated with its claimed nature reserve at the shoal that prohibit unauthorized fishing, mining, coral collection and giant-clam extraction. Beijing also said Coast Guard patrols would enforce the rules (Reuters, 2026b).

From a Philippine perspective, these regulations directly affect a traditional Filipino fishing ground and represent another administrative mechanism through which China seeks to normalize control over access.

Security Incidents

The July 24 water-cannon attacks and close approaches were the principal confirmed security incidents inside this SITREP period.

The approach of China Coast Guard vessel 21581 to within approximately seven meters of BRP Datu Paduhinog created a significant collision hazard. The use of water cannon at such close range added risk to crews operating aboard the Philippine vessel. The Philippine Coast Guard characterized the maneuver as dangerous and unprofessional (Reuters, 2026a).

The July 24 encounters followed confrontations earlier that week, including incidents outside the formal start time of this SITREP. Those earlier events are relevant as context because the July 24 operation was not an isolated encounter. Philippine forces entered the reporting period already facing sustained Chinese physical interference.

No confirmed collision between Philippine and Chinese vessels, radar-targeting incident or new physical boarding incident was identified in credible reporting between July 24 at 00:01 and August 7 at 20:00.

Weather and Sea Conditions

Weather affected the western Philippines during much of the first part of the reporting period.

On July 24, Tropical Storm Kiyapo, internationally named Noul, was moving toward extreme northern Luzon. PAGASA also reported that the Southwest Monsoon was affecting western portions of the country. Occidental Mindoro, Palawan and parts of Western Visayas were expected to receive occasional rain, while other areas experienced scattered rain and thunderstorms (PAGASA, 2026a).

For July 25, PAGASA forecast monsoon-driven rain over Zambales, Bataan, Palawan, Occidental Mindoro and other western areas. These conditions were operationally relevant to the approaches to Bajo de Masinloc and other western Philippine maritime zones because rain, reduced visibility, wind and increased sea state can complicate navigation and small-boat operations (PAGASA, 2026a).

PAGASA’s subseasonal outlook for July 29 through August 4 continued to show the Southwest Monsoon influencing the western Philippines, with substantial rainfall expected over Western Luzon, Palawan, Mindoro and Western Visayas (PAGASA, 2026b).

There is no evidence that weather halted the larger strategic pattern of Chinese patrols around Bajo de Masinloc. It likely affected day-to-day operating conditions for smaller fishing vessels more sharply than for large coast guard or naval ships.

Seismic and Geophysical Activity

PHIVOLCS recorded minor earthquakes in western Luzon during the reporting period, including a magnitude 1.9 event approximately 14 kilometers northeast of Cabangan, Zambales, on July 28 (PHIVOLCS, 2026).

The recorded event was small and no evidence reviewed for this SITREP indicates that it affected maritime operations, coastal infrastructure or West Philippine Sea security activity.

No relevant tsunami warning or significant geophysical event affecting West Philippine Sea operations was identified during the reporting period.

Assessment

The period from July 24 through August 7 shows continuity in Chinese gray-zone operations rather than a fundamentally new phase.

The operating method remained layered. China used coast guard ships to challenge and physically interfere with Philippine government vessels; maritime militia vessels were present around Philippine operations; military air and naval forces conducted patrols and drills; Beijing issued administrative restrictions affecting fishing and resource activity; and Chinese officials continued advancing legal and sovereignty claims that conflict with Philippine positions and the 2016 arbitral ruling.

This combination matters more than any single water-cannon event.

Bajo de Masinloc remains the central pressure point. China is not relying solely on periodic confrontation there. It is attempting to make Chinese enforcement, patrols, regulations and military presence appear routine. Repetition is part of the method.

The Philippine response during the reporting period also showed continuity. PCG and BFAR vessels continued operations despite interference. Government programs continued supporting Filipino fisherfolk. Manila maintained its international-law position and sought stronger maritime-domain-awareness capabilities through international partnerships.

The most important strategic feature of the reporting period was therefore normalization. Chinese coercive activity remained sustained, multi-agency and persistent, while Philippine agencies continued to operate rather than concede access through absence.

That pattern remains unstable because routine gray-zone encounters can still produce an accidental or deliberate collision, injury or other event with consequences beyond the immediate encounter. Nothing reviewed through 20:00 Philippine Standard Time on August 7 indicates that the underlying dispute or operational pressure has diminished.

References

ABS-CBN News. (2026, July 24). There is political will to finish SCS Code of Conduct by year-end, says Lazaro. ABS-CBN News.

Associated Press. (2026, August 3). Top US admiral warns against coercion, says no nation will dominate Indo-Pacific. AP News.

European External Action Service. (2026, July 24). Philippines: EU and the Philippines deepen security and defence cooperation. European Union.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026a, July 24). Weekly weather outlook: July 24–31, 2026. Department of Science and Technology.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026b). Sub-seasonal climate prediction: July 22–August 4, 2026. Department of Science and Technology.

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. (2026). Latest earthquake information: July 2026. Department of Science and Technology.

Philippine News Agency. (2026a, July 24). CCG intensifies water cannon attack on Day 2 of BFAR, PCG fuel mission.

Philippine News Agency. (2026b, July 29). EU aid to beef up PH maritime security.

Reuters. (2026a, July 24). Philippines accuses China of using water cannon on its vessels for a second day. Reuters.

Reuters. (2026b, August 1). China conducts naval, air patrols around disputed shoal in South China Sea. Reuters.

Reuters. (2026c, July 10). A decade after historic ruling, Philippine fishermen say driven away from disputed shoal by China. Reuters.

Xinhua. (2026, July 24). China Coast Guard takes control measures against Philippine vessels engaged in illegal activities near Huangyan Dao.

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