By the Editors of WPS News

For the past four years, the Philippines has engaged in a series of diplomatic maneuvers to counter China’s incursions into its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the West Philippine Sea. From fiery rhetoric to international arbitration appeals, these actions project an image of a nation standing firm against a regional giant. Yet, a closer examination reveals a troubling truth: these moves are largely performative, designed to appease China while placating domestic audiences. Far from securing the nation’s sovereignty, they leave Filipino fishermen, maritime security, and territorial integrity at risk, offering little more than symbolic gestures in the face of Beijing’s relentless expansion.

Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the Philippines has pursued a strategy that appears robust on the surface. The government has lodged diplomatic protests, strengthened defense ties with the United States, and invoked the 2016 Arbitral Ruling to challenge China’s claims (Philippine News Agency, 2024). Marcos has publicly condemned Chinese actions, such as the August 2023 water cannon attack on Philippine resupply boats at Ayungin Shoal, and established a hotline with Beijing to de-escalate tensions (United States Institute of Peace, 2023). These steps resonate with Filipinos, 87% of whom support a firm stance against China, according to a 2023 Pulse Asia survey. But the reality on the ground tells a different story: Chinese vessels continue to dominate Scarborough Shoal, block Filipino fishermen, and disrupt resupply missions with impunity (Reuters, 2024).

Consider the much-touted hotline established during Marcos’ January 2023 visit to China. Hailed as a diplomatic win, it promised direct communication to prevent maritime escalations. Yet, when Chinese forces fired water cannons at Philippine boats in August 2023, calls to the hotline went unanswered, exposing its ineffectiveness (United States Institute of Peace, 2023). Similarly, the Philippines’ repeated diplomatic protests—over 100 filed since 2021—have elicited no meaningful response from Beijing, which continues to reject the 2016 Arbitral Ruling and assert its “Nine-Dash Line” claim (Foreign Service Institute, 2024). These protests, while satisfying to a domestic audience, have failed to alter China’s behavior or restore access to Filipino fishermen, who face harassment and declining livelihoods due to Chinese blockades (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023).

The Marcos administration’s pivot to stronger U.S. alliances further illustrates this charade. The 2023 expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), granting the U.S. access to four additional Philippine bases, was framed as a deterrent to Chinese aggression (GIS Reports, 2025). Joint military exercises with the U.S., Japan, and Australia in the Philippines’ EEZ, such as the April 2024 maritime cooperative activity, project strength (Reuters, 2024). Yet, these moves have not stopped Chinese coast guard vessels from ramming Filipino ships or deploying floating barriers at Scarborough Shoal (Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2023). Instead, they risk escalating tensions without guaranteeing protection, as the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty’s applicability to the West Philippine Sea remains ambiguous (Foreign Affairs, 2024). This reliance on foreign allies creates a spectacle of resistance but does little to address the immediate threats to Filipino fishermen and maritime personnel.

The Philippines’ diplomatic approach also sidesteps the economic leverage it could wield. China remains a vital trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $14.6 billion in 2023, despite maritime tensions (Foreign Service Institute, 2024). Rather than using economic interdependence to pressure Beijing, the government compartmentalizes trade and security, avoiding sanctions or trade restrictions that might provoke China. This cautious approach, while preserving economic ties, signals weakness, emboldening China to continue its incursions without fear of economic repercussions (Asia Times, 2024).

The Manila Dialogue in November 2024, a Track 1.5 platform involving Filipino and Chinese scholars, was another attempt to showcase diplomacy. It emphasized dialogue and the 2016 Arbitral Ruling but yielded no concrete commitments from China, which defended its actions and dismissed Manila’s claims (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2024). Such forums create an illusion of progress while China’s coast guard and maritime militia continue hostile acts, like the October 2024 sideswiping of a Filipino vessel near Thitu Island (Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2024). These incidents highlight the gap between diplomatic posturing and tangible outcomes.

This pattern of symbolic resistance is not new. Under President Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines initially pursued appeasement, hoping economic benefits would offset maritime concessions. When China failed to deliver promised infrastructure investments, Duterte shifted to limited balancing, but his administration avoided direct confrontation (Sage Journals, 2024). Marcos has intensified the rhetoric and alliances, but the core strategy remains unchanged: prioritize domestic approval over substantive action. The result is a cycle of protests and partnerships that neither deters China nor secures the EEZ, leaving Filipino fishermen and maritime forces vulnerable.

The Filipino people deserve more than political theater. The government must move beyond gestures and pursue a strategy that combines diplomatic pressure with enforceable measures. This could include coordinated ASEAN action, targeted economic sanctions, and accelerated military modernization to bolster maritime defenses (Crisis Group, 2021). Without such steps, the Philippines risks ceding its sovereign rights while offering its people a hollow narrative of resistance.

The West Philippine Sea is not a stage for optics—it is a lifeline for millions of Filipinos. The government’s diplomatic moves, while popular, are a dangerous game of appeasement cloaked in defiance. It’s time for Manila to prioritize real ramifications over rhetoric, ensuring that the nation’s sovereignty and its people’s livelihoods are not sacrificed for the sake of appearances.

References
Australian Institute of International Affairs. (2024, November 27). The Manila Dialogue’s role in shaping South China Sea diplomacy. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au
Crisis Group. (2021, December 2). The Philippines’ dilemma: How to manage tensions in the South China Sea. Crisis Group. https://www.crisisgroup.org
Foreign Affairs. (2024, September 18). America and the Philippines should call China’s bluff. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com
Foreign Policy Research Institute. (2023, December 4). How is the Philippines preparing for conflict in the South China Sea? Foreign Policy Research Institute. https://www.fpri.org
Foreign Service Institute. (2024, May 24). Philippines-China relations: Beyond the territorial disputes. Foreign Service Institute. https://fsi.gov.ph
GIS Reports. (2025, February 28). Philippine outlook amid U.S.-China rivalry. GIS Reports. https://www.gisreportsonline.com
Philippine News Agency. (2024, July 24). PH sustains diplomatic approach to deescalate tensions in SCS. Philippine News Agency. https://www.pna.gov.ph
Reuters. (2024, December 6). China-Philippines relations: Major events in South China Sea dispute. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com
Sage Journals. (2024). Exploring the Philippines’ evolving grand strategy in the face of China’s maritime expansion: From the Aquino administration to the Marcos. Sage Journals. https://journals.sagepub.com
United States Institute of Peace. (2023, October 17). Amid China tensions, the Philippines relies on alliances and rule of law. United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org
Asia Times. (2024, May 10). China-Philippines near full diplomatic collapse at sea. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com

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