West Philippine Sea Special Report: Presence Is Not the Problem—Harassment Is

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — July 1, 2026

For years, reports from the West Philippine Sea have often focused on one question: “Why are the Chinese here?”

It is an understandable question. Chinese Coast Guard ships, maritime militia vessels, research ships, and naval vessels appear regularly in waters claimed by the Philippines. Their presence frustrates Filipino fishermen, challenges Philippine patrols, and creates constant diplomatic tension.

But there is another question that deserves equal attention.

Is simply being there illegal?

The answer is more complicated than many people realize.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is not the same thing as territorial waters.

Territorial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles from a nation’s coastline. Within those waters, the coastal state exercises sovereignty much like it does over its land territory, subject to limited rights such as innocent passage.

An Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from the coast. Within an EEZ, the coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, conserve, and exploit natural resources, including fisheries, oil, gas, and seabed minerals. It also has jurisdiction over certain artificial islands, scientific research, and environmental protection.

However, an EEZ does not become closed national water.

Other countries generally retain the freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized under international law. Commercial shipping, naval vessels, and aircraft may pass through an EEZ without asking permission, provided they comply with international law.

That distinction matters.

The issue is not that Chinese ships merely exist inside portions of the Philippine EEZ.

The issue is what they do once they are there.

The 2016 arbitral ruling under UNCLOS found that China’s “nine-dash line” has no legal basis under the Convention. The tribunal also concluded that China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights by interfering with fishing, petroleum exploration, and other lawful economic activities inside the Philippine EEZ.

In other words, international law draws a clear line.

Navigation is one thing.

Interference is something entirely different.

When Chinese Coast Guard vessels block Philippine resupply missions, use water cannons against Philippine vessels, direct military-grade lasers at crews, shadow fishing boats, or prevent Filipino fishermen from accessing traditional fishing grounds, those actions raise legal concerns because they interfere with rights specifically granted to the Philippines under UNCLOS.

The same principle would apply to any nation.

If an American destroyer sailed peacefully through another country’s EEZ while exercising internationally recognized navigational freedoms, that would generally be lawful.

If that same destroyer began preventing local fishermen from working, blocked government vessels, or interfered with lawful resource development, the legal picture would change dramatically.

The standard is behavior—not nationality.

That distinction often gets lost in public discussion.

It is understandable that many Filipinos grow frustrated after years of gray-zone operations. These actions rarely cross the threshold into open warfare, yet they steadily apply pressure through persistent presence, intimidation, obstruction, and repeated challenges to normal maritime activity.

Gray-zone tactics are designed to exploit exactly that space between peace and armed conflict.

They rely on patience.

They rely on repetition.

And they rely on opponents eventually accepting abnormal behavior as normal.

That is why documentation matters.

Every patrol recorded by the Philippine Coast Guard, every encounter documented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, every report from Filipino fishermen, and every diplomatic protest helps establish an accurate historical record of events. The goal is not merely today’s headline, but the accumulation of evidence over months and years.

The Philippines does not strengthen its legal position by responding unlawfully.

It strengthens its position by consistently demonstrating that it is operating within international law while documenting actions that violate those same rules.

The dispute in the West Philippine Sea is often portrayed as a simple argument over maps.

It is not.

It is equally an argument over whether international rules apply equally to large and small nations.

Freedom of navigation belongs to everyone.

So do the protections that prevent one country from using intimidation or coercion to deny another country the rights guaranteed under international law.

Those principles are worth defending—not only for the Philippines, but for every nation that depends on open seas governed by law instead of power.

References

Permanent Court of Arbitration. (2016). The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s Republic of China), Award of 12 July 2016.

United Nations. (1982). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

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