中国不愿解决的形象问题
By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News
Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — September 30, 2026 — 17:35
China’s perception problem is no longer a side issue.
It is one of the central facts shaping how the country is received internationally.
Across 25 countries surveyed by Pew Research Center in 2025, a median of 36% held a favorable view of China, while 54% held an unfavorable view. In the same survey, a median of 25% expressed confidence in Xi Jinping to do the right thing in world affairs, while 66% said they had little or no confidence in him (Pew Research Center, 2025).
That does not mean China is isolated. It does mean China is operating under a credibility burden that it has not solved.
The Problem Is Not Visibility
China is not suffering from a lack of presence.
It is economically central, diplomatically active, and deeply embedded in global supply chains. In Southeast Asia in particular, the picture is mixed rather than uniformly hostile. In a 2024 Pew survey across ten Asia-Pacific countries, a median of 61% said China contributes at least a fair amount to global peace and stability, with especially positive views in several Southeast Asian countries (Pew Research Center, 2024).
That is exactly why the perception problem matters.
China is visible. China is important. China is often useful. And yet, in many places, it is still not trusted.
What the Region Is Actually Saying
The ISEAS State of Southeast Asia 2025 Survey shows why.
Among ASEAN-10 respondents, trust in China rose compared with the previous year, but distrust still exceeded trust in six of the ten ASEAN states. Among respondents who distrust China, 47.6% said China’s economic and military power threatens their countries’ interests and sovereignty; that concern was especially strong in the Philippines and Vietnam (Seah et al., 2025).
That is not a messaging issue alone.
That is a lived strategic perception.
It means China can be seen as economically valuable and strategically threatening at the same time. That dual image is the core problem.
Why Messaging Alone Will Not Fix It
States do not judge a major power only by what it says.
They judge it by repetition, pattern, and proximity.
When a government hears language about mutual respect and shared development, but also watches sustained maritime pressure, coercive signaling, or legal interpretations that seem to move only one way, the words lose force. Perception is built from accumulated observation, not public-relations language.
China keeps acting as though explanation can substitute for reassurance.
It cannot.
The Global Governance Gap
This problem appears beyond Southeast Asia as well.
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, China is pursuing a broad strategy to shape global governance, supporting institutions and agreements that fit its goals while also trying to reshape norms and standards where it sees the current system as misaligned with Beijing’s priorities (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.).
That is a serious power strategy. But it also deepens suspicion when other states conclude that China wants the advantages of the system without accepting the same restraints that others are expected to follow.
That is where image hardens into reputation.
A country can be respected for its scale and still distrusted for how it uses that scale.
Taiwan Makes the Problem Worse
Taiwan sharpens every existing doubt.
The Council on Foreign Relations describes Taiwan as the likeliest potential flash point in U.S.-China relations and notes that Beijing has increased political and military pressure on Taipei, including large-scale exercises around the island (Council on Foreign Relations, 2026).
Whatever China says about peaceful intentions, the regional lesson drawn from visible pressure is straightforward: if Beijing feels blocked on a core issue, it is willing to escalate pressure substantially.
That affects far more than Taiwan.
It shapes how every neighboring state interprets Chinese intentions in other disputes.
A government does not need to believe war is imminent to conclude that the direction of travel is dangerous.
What China Refuses to Admit
China’s problem is not simply that other countries misunderstand it.
Sometimes they understand it perfectly well.
They see a state with enormous capacity, long-term planning, and real developmental achievements. They also see a government that often treats external concern as bad faith, external caution as containment, and external resistance as illegitimate.
That combination is what drives the perception problem.
China wants to be viewed as a stabilizing power while repeatedly acting in ways that make others build hedges, backups, and counterweights.
That is not an image failure. That is a strategic contradiction.
What Would Actually Improve China’s Image
The answer is not Western-style branding. It is behavioral consistency.
If China wants to improve how it is perceived, it has to reduce the gap between its stated respect for sovereignty and the way neighboring states experience Chinese power. It has to show that economic cooperation does not come paired with creeping strategic pressure. It has to make predictability visible.
Image improves when fear declines.
Not before.
The Bottom Line
China’s perception problem persists because it is rooted in conduct, not just rhetoric.
As long as Beijing continues to ask for trust while generating caution, it will keep running into the same wall. It may still gain trade, access, and influence. But it will not gain the kind of durable confidence that makes a major power genuinely reassuring to its neighbors.
That is the problem China keeps trying to explain away instead of fix.
This essay is written by Cliff Potts, Editor-in-Chief of WPS News. WPS News has been active in one form or another on the internet since 2009; for more information, visit https://cliffpotts.org.
If this work helps you understand what’s happening, help me keep it going: https://www.patreon.com/cw/WPSNews
References
Council on Foreign Relations. (2026, March 13). Taiwan explained: Why China claims it, and why the U.S. is involved.
Council on Foreign Relations. (n.d.). China’s approach to global governance.
Pew Research Center. (2024, July 9). How people in the Asia-Pacific region view China’s role on the world stage.
Pew Research Center. (2025, July 15). Views of China and Xi Jinping in 2025.
Seah, S., Lin, J., Martinus, M., Fong, K., Pham, T. P. T., & Aridati, I. Z. (2025). The State of Southeast Asia: 2025 survey report.
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