By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — July 12, 2026

Overview

The reporting period was marked by the continued presence of China Coast Guard and People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels at major West Philippine Sea locations, Philippine diplomatic activity surrounding the 10th anniversary of the 2016 Arbitral Award, and worsening sea conditions caused by Typhoon Inday and the enhanced southwest monsoon.

No publicly confirmed collision, water-cannon attack, radar-targeting incident, flare deployment, or other major physical confrontation was identified between July 3 at 00:01 and July 11 at 23:59 Philippine Standard Time. This did not represent an end to Chinese pressure. The available reporting instead showed the continued normalization of persistent Chinese government vessel deployments, restricted Filipino fishing access, and regular rejection of Philippine maritime rights.

The most recent aggregate vessel count released during the reporting period covered June rather than the exact nine-day SITREP window. It nevertheless provided the clearest official measure of the continuing Chinese surface presence near Bajo de Masinloc, Ayungin Shoal, Escoda Shoal, and Pag-asa Island (Casilao, 2026).

Diplomatic Developments

Philippine officials used events surrounding the 10th anniversary of the July 12, 2016, Arbitral Award to restate that the ruling is final, legally binding, and central to the country’s maritime policy.

At a July 10 conference in Manila, Foreign Affairs Secretary Maria Theresa Lazaro described the ruling as a legal guide during periods of coercion and competing maritime claims. Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., military leaders, diplomats, legal experts, and civil-society representatives also attended discussions on protecting Philippine rights, strengthening defense cooperation, and responding to maritime disinformation (Gomez, 2026; Paunan, 2026).

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. reaffirmed the Philippine commitment to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and peaceful dispute resolution during a diplomatic reception connected to the anniversary. He said the award concerns the safety and livelihoods of Filipino fisherfolk as well as the country’s sovereign rights. He also stated that the South China Sea should remain an area of peace, trade, environmental protection, and cooperation rather than conflict (Philippine Information Agency, 2026a).

Australia publicly criticized destabilizing and dangerous conduct by Chinese vessels. Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said her government would continue raising concerns about such behavior. China, through its embassy in Manila, repeated that it would not recognize the arbitration decision and called the award illegal, null, and void. Beijing also stated that the ruling would not weaken its determination to defend its claimed maritime interests (Gomez, 2026).

The Philippine policy organization Stratbase Institute called for any future South China Sea Code of Conduct to use the Arbitral Award as a legal baseline rather than treating Philippine rights as negotiable. The organization’s statement noted that the Philippines, as ASEAN chair in 2026, was seeking progress toward a substantive and legally binding code (Stratbase Institute, 2026).

On July 5, the civilian coalition Atin Ito renewed its call for July 12 to be declared National West Philippine Sea Victory Day. Cebu City had previously approved a local annual observance, which received support from the Department of National Defense (Ferreras, 2026).

Maritime Activity (Surface)

On July 7, the Armed Forces of the Philippines released its aggregate monitoring figures for June. The AFP said it had tracked 74 Chinese government vessels near four major West Philippine Sea features. The total was lower than the 82 vessels reported in May but continued to show a large and distributed Chinese presence (Casilao, 2026).

The June count included:

Bajo de Masinloc: 41 vessels, consisting of 16 People’s Liberation Army Navy vessels and 25 China Coast Guard vessels.

Ayungin Shoal: 16 vessels, consisting of four PLA Navy vessels and 12 China Coast Guard vessels.

Escoda Shoal: eight vessels, consisting of five PLA Navy vessels and three China Coast Guard vessels.

Pag-asa Island: nine vessels, consisting of four PLA Navy vessels and five China Coast Guard vessels.

The reported count covered government vessels and did not provide a separate total for suspected Chinese maritime militia ships. It should not be interpreted as a precise count of every Chinese vessel present during each day of the July 3–11 reporting period.

The AFP also reported monitoring 20,494 domestic and foreign vessels during June. Of those, 14,548 responded to Philippine radio challenges and 5,946 did not. AFP spokesperson Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad said the Chinese deployments undermined the rules-based maritime order and Philippine sovereign rights (Casilao, 2026).

No Philippine agency publicly announced a major resupply confrontation, emergency escort mission, or new extended standoff during the exact SITREP period in the official and major-news sources reviewed. There was also no sufficiently detailed public vessel-tracking record available to produce a reliable day-by-day position list for Philippine and Chinese ships.

Air Activity

No official Philippine release or major news-agency report reviewed for this SITREP documented a specific air intercept, unsafe close approach, flare deployment, or unusual radio-warning incident over the West Philippine Sea during the reporting period.

This finding does not establish that no Philippine patrol or surveillance flights occurred. It means that no flight-specific operation or confrontation between July 3 and July 11 was publicly documented in the reviewed record.

Previously reported Chinese flare deployments and aerial warnings remain part of the broader operating environment, but those earlier incidents are outside this SITREP’s timeframe and are not counted as current-period events.

Fisherfolk and Civilian Activity

Hundreds of Zambales fisherfolk participated in a July 5 public action organized with Atin Ito. Nearly 80 fishing boats were used to form the colors of the Philippine flag and the words “WPS, ATIN ITO!” The activity supported the proposed annual West Philippine Sea Victory Day and emphasized the continued connection between national maritime rights and fishing communities (Ferreras, 2026).

Reuters interviews conducted in Masinloc showed that Chinese pressure continued to influence where Filipino fishermen were willing to operate. Fishermen Rony Drio and Henrilito Empoc said they no longer traveled to Bajo de Masinloc because of fear of harassment. Drio had not returned since 2024, while Empoc had not returned since 2022. Both instead fished closer to the Zambales coast (Portugal & Lema, 2026).

Empoc described previous incidents in which Chinese vessels used water cannons against Filipino boats and Chinese personnel cut fishing-vessel anchor lines. Drio described being ordered out of the shoal’s lagoon during an earlier encounter. These accounts were published during the SITREP period, but the reported confrontations occurred before July 3 and should not be recorded as new incidents during this reporting window (Portugal & Lema, 2026).

The interviews provide evidence of an important gray-zone effect: physical force does not have to be used every week to limit Philippine activity. Past harassment, backed by the continuing presence of Chinese government vessels, has caused some Filipino fishermen to avoid traditional fishing grounds.

Security Incidents

No collision, ramming, water-cannon use, laser illumination, radar targeting, vessel boarding, anchor cutting, flare deployment, injury, or vessel damage was publicly confirmed as having occurred during the exact July 3–11 reporting period in the sources reviewed.

Reports published during the period included fishermen’s accounts of previous water-cannon attacks, cut anchor lines, and forced departures from Bajo de Masinloc. Those accounts confirm the continuing consequences of earlier Chinese actions but were not dated as new incidents within this SITREP period (Portugal & Lema, 2026).

The principal security condition during the period was therefore persistent Chinese force presence rather than a single acute confrontation. The deployment of PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels at several widely separated Philippine maritime features allowed China to maintain continuous pressure without requiring a major incident.

Weather and Sea Conditions

Typhoon Inday, internationally named Bavi, and the enhanced southwest monsoon became significant operational factors during the second half of the reporting period.

At 11 p.m. on July 8, PAGASA reported that the enhanced southwest monsoon and the outer circulation of Super Typhoon Inday were producing strong to gale-force gusts over Zambales, Bataan, Pangasinan, most of MIMAROPA, and other areas. PAGASA forecast waves of up to 2.5 meters around the Kalayaan Islands and up to 2 meters along Zambales, western Bataan, Occidental Mindoro, and portions of Palawan. Motorbancas and similarly sized craft were advised to use caution and avoid navigation where possible (PAGASA, 2026a).

By 5 a.m. on July 11, PAGASA forecast rough seas reaching 3 meters along Zambales, western Pangasinan, Bataan, Occidental Mindoro, Palawan, and the Kalayaan Islands. Small vessels, including motorbancas, were advised not to venture to sea under those conditions. Strong to gale-force gusts associated with Inday and the southwest monsoon were expected over most of the country (PAGASA, 2026b).

These conditions increased the danger to small fishing craft and reduced safe operating windows for civilian boats in western Philippine waters. Larger coast guard, naval, and government ships were better able to operate, but rough seas could still affect launch operations, boarding, visual observation, and smaller support vessels.

Seismic and Geophysical Activity

No seismic or geophysical event relevant to West Philippine Sea operations was identified in the PHIVOLCS public information reviewed for the July 3–11 period. No earthquake, volcanic event, tsunami advisory, or related geophysical hazard was found to have materially affected maritime operations covered by this SITREP (Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology, 2026).

Assessment

The period did not show a clearly documented new escalation. It showed the continued normalization of Chinese gray-zone operations.

China maintained enough PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels to cover several Philippine maritime features at the same time. The monthly count released during the period was slightly lower than the previous month, but 74 vessels remained a substantial government presence. A small numerical decline did not alter the geographic reach or coercive purpose of the deployment.

The effect on Philippine civilians remained visible. Some Masinloc fishermen continued to avoid Bajo de Masinloc years after their last direct encounters. This demonstrates how repeated harassment can create lasting limits on access even during weeks without a newly reported water-cannon attack or collision.

The Philippine response during the period centered on maritime monitoring, public transparency, legal messaging, international cooperation, and civilian participation. Government officials continued to treat the 2016 Arbitral Award as the legal foundation for Philippine maritime entitlements. Civil-society and fisherfolk activities reinforced that the issue concerns food security, employment, local communities, and national rights rather than an abstract territorial contest.

Weather conditions were the largest short-term change in the operating environment. Typhoon Inday and the enhanced southwest monsoon produced rough seas along Zambales and Palawan and around the Kalayaan Islands. These conditions placed the greatest burden on Filipino fishermen and other small-craft operators.

The overall pattern remained sustained pressure without open armed conflict: regular Chinese government deployments, restricted civilian access, rejection of the arbitration ruling, and the continuing use of presence and uncertainty to make Chinese control appear routine.

References

Casilao, J. L. (2026, July 7). 74 Chinese vessels monitored in WPS in June—AFP. GMA News Online.

Ferreras, V. A. (2026, July 5). Declare July 12 National West Philippine Sea Victory Day, Atin Ito urges. GMA News Online.

Gomez, J. (2026, July 10). Philippines marks anniversary of South China Sea arbitration ruling. Associated Press.

Paunan, J. C. (2026, July 10). Teodoro leads high-level forum marking South China Sea Arbitral award. Philippine Information Agency.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026a, July 8). Tropical Cyclone Bulletin No. 5: Super Typhoon Inday (Bavi). Department of Science and Technology.

Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration. (2026b, July 11). Tropical Cyclone Bulletin No. 14: Typhoon Inday (Bavi). Department of Science and Technology.

Philippine Information Agency. (2026a, July 11). President Marcos reaffirms commitment to rules-based order on 10th anniversary of arbitral award.

Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology. (2026). Earthquake and geophysical monitoring information. Department of Science and Technology.

Portugal, A., & Lema, K. (2026, July 10). A decade after historic ruling, Philippine fishermen say driven away from disputed shoal by China. Reuters.

Stratbase Institute. (2026, July 11). Beyond 10 years: Stratbase urges PH to advance a South China Sea code of conduct anchored on arbitral ruling. Philippine Information Agency.

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