The Case for a Third Impeachment: What Does the Evidence Actually Show?

By Cliff Potts, CSO, and Editor-in-Chief of WPS News

Baybay City, Leyte, Philippines — October 20, 2026

For eight weeks, this series has asked a question that should never be answered casually:

Has Donald J. Trump committed conduct during his second presidency serious enough to justify impeachment for a third time?

Not whether Donald Trump is offensive.

Not whether his policies are unpopular.

Not whether Democrats despise him.

Not whether Republicans defend him.

Not whether WPS News agrees with him.

Impeachment is considerably more serious than any of those questions.

The Constitution gives the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment and the Senate the sole power to try an impeachment. A president may be removed following impeachment and Senate conviction for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” (U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2–3; art. II, § 4).

Congressional constitutional analysis makes an equally important point: “high Crimes and Misdemeanors” historically reaches abuses of governmental power and injuries to the constitutional system rather than merely ordinary violations of criminal statutes (Constitution Annotated, 2026).

So now comes the difficult part.

What has the evidence actually established?

THE EVIDENCE: THIS IS NOT A HYPOTHETICAL IMPEACHMENT QUESTION

Members of Congress have already introduced impeachment resolutions against Trump during his second presidency.

Representative Shri Thanedar introduced H.Res. 353 on April 28, 2025. The resolution contained multiple proposed articles accusing Trump of obstruction of justice and abuse of executive power, usurpation of congressional appropriations authority, abuse of trade powers, violations involving First Amendment rights, creation of an unlawful office, bribery and corruption, and other misconduct (U.S. House of Representatives, 2025a).

Representative Al Green subsequently introduced H.Res. 537 following Trump’s military strikes against Iran. Green alleged that Trump had usurped Congress’s constitutional war authority (U.S. House of Representatives, 2025b). The House did not adopt that impeachment resolution.

Later, H.Res. 939 again sought Trump’s impeachment. A January 2026 Congressional Record entry documents Green discussing the 140 House members who had voted for that resolution when it previously came before the chamber (U.S. House of Representatives, 2026).

Those are facts.

They establish that impeachment allegations exist and that members of Congress have formally placed them into the constitutional process.

They do not establish that the allegations are correct.

An impeachment resolution is an accusation, not evidence sufficient by itself to prove the accusation.

THE EVIDENCE: THE POWER OF THE PURSE

This series examined Trump’s conflict with Congress over appropriated money.

That issue has not disappeared.

On September 25, 2026, Trump sought to withhold more than $800 million already appropriated by Congress for programs involving refugee assistance, minority business development, education and other areas. The administration characterized the programs as wasteful or contrary to its policies and relied upon a disputed “pocket rescission” theory. Republican Senator Susan Collins, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, called the attempted withholding illegal and an infringement upon Congress’s constitutional spending authority (Reuters, 2026a).

That development adds to earlier Government Accountability Office findings examined in this series concerning administration withholding of appropriated funds.

What does that prove?

It proves a continuing conflict between presidential control of executive agencies and Congress’s Article I appropriations authority.

It does not automatically prove an impeachable offense.

The impeachment question depends upon whether Congress determines that disputed spending actions represent good-faith legal disagreements about executive authority or a deliberate pattern of refusing to execute spending laws enacted by Congress.

That distinction matters.

THE EVIDENCE: USING FEDERAL MONEY TO OBTAIN UNRELATED POLICY CHANGES

Another recent case sharpens that question.

On September 28, a federal judge blocked the Trump administration from conditioning portions of approximately $1.1 billion in counterterrorism grants on changes to state and local election administration.

The administration sought measures including hand-marked ballots, manual audits and verification of voter rolls using Department of Homeland Security data. U.S. District Judge Amir Ali concluded that FEMA lacked authority to attach those election-related requirements to the counterterrorism grants (Reuters, 2026b).

Again, the evidence is the ruling.

The conclusion requires another step.

A court finding that an administration exceeded statutory authority does not automatically become a high crime or misdemeanor. Presidents lose lawsuits. Every administration does.

The constitutional issue becomes more serious if Congress can demonstrate a sustained practice of knowingly using federal money for purposes Congress did not authorize after the boundaries of executive authority have been made clear.

THE EVIDENCE: COURTS AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Earlier in this series, we examined confrontations between the administration and federal courts over immigration, deportation, grants, executive orders and other exercises of presidential authority.

Those disputes have produced victories and defeats for both sides.

That fact is important.

The Supreme Court itself has permitted some Trump policies to proceed while litigation continues. On September 29, for example, the Court allowed the administration to resume certain deportations of migrants to third countries while agreeing to hear the underlying dispute (Reuters, 2026c).

Therefore, opposition to Trump cannot simply convert every contested executive action into “defiance of the courts.”

Sometimes the administration wins.

Sometimes it loses.

Sometimes appellate courts reverse lower courts.

Sometimes the Supreme Court changes what the government may lawfully do.

The relevant impeachment evidence would instead involve intentional refusal to comply with binding judicial orders while those orders remain legally operative.

That is a much narrower allegation and requires much stronger proof.

THE EVIDENCE: WAR POWERS

We also examined Trump’s use of military force without prior congressional authorization.

This is another area where simplistic conclusions fail.

Presidents of both parties have used military force without formal declarations of war for generations. Congress has frequently tolerated that practice, funded operations after they began, or declined to assert its own authority aggressively.

Trump did not invent unilateral presidential warfare.

That history weakens any argument claiming that military action without a declaration of war is automatically impeachable.

But it does not eliminate Congress’s constitutional role.

Article I assigns Congress major war powers while Article II makes the president commander in chief. The boundary between those authorities remains contested.

The impeachment issue therefore depends upon the circumstances: the scale and purpose of military action, the existence or absence of congressional authorization, immediacy of the threat, statutory requirements, presidential legal justification and whether executive action effectively transfers Congress’s war-making authority permanently to the presidency.

Again, evidence first.

Conclusion second.

THE EVIDENCE: PRIVATE FINANCIAL INTERESTS

The October 6 installment examined another category entirely: Trump’s continuing private financial interests and foreign-connected transactions involving businesses associated with him and his family.

Those relationships create conflict-of-interest questions.

But conflict of interest is not synonymous with bribery.

The Constitution specifically identifies bribery as impeachable conduct (U.S. Const. art. II, § 4). Proving bribery requires evidence considerably stronger than showing that somebody financially benefited while holding office.

Congress would need to determine whether anything of value was connected to an official act, agreement or understanding.

Absent that evidence, the responsible conclusion is not “bribery proven.”

It is “further investigation may be warranted.”

That difference is enormous.

THE EVIDENCE: RETRIBUTION

The October 13 installment examined allegations that presidential power has been used against Trump’s perceived adversaries.

Federal prosecutors have investigated or prosecuted people who previously investigated or opposed Trump.

The administration has acted against law firms, universities and media organizations involved in disputes with the president.

Some of those actions have been blocked by courts.

But here too, sequence and correlation are not enough.

The federal government possesses legitimate prosecutorial, regulatory, contracting and enforcement authority.

A president is allowed to investigate genuine crimes.

An administration is allowed to enforce laws against political opponents.

The constitutional violation would arise if governmental authority were deliberately used against someone because that person opposed the president.

Proving that requires evidence of intent.

Presidential statements may contribute to that evidence.

Internal communications could contribute considerably more.

So could testimony demonstrating that career officials were pressured to take actions unsupported by ordinary enforcement standards.

Without that connection, retaliation remains an allegation.

With sufficient evidence establishing that connection, it becomes something much more serious.

THE EVIDENCE: JANUARY 6 STILL MATTERS, BUT DIFFERENTLY

January 6 cannot simply become a third-impeachment charge recycled from Trump’s second impeachment.

Trump was already impeached for conduct surrounding January 6 and was acquitted by the Senate. Constitution Annotated records both of Trump’s previous impeachments and acquittals (Constitution Annotated, 2026).

But January 6 remains relevant context.

So does Trump’s return to office.

So do his January 6 clemency actions.

They provide evidence about Trump’s approach to presidential authority and accountability and about conduct previously judged by the House to constitute an impeachable offense.

History can illuminate current conduct.

It cannot substitute for current conduct.

If there is to be a third impeachment, the strongest constitutional case would rest principally upon what Trump has done during this presidency.

THE CUMULATIVE QUESTION

This is where the analysis changes.

Each individual dispute can be explained separately.

Appropriations?

A disagreement about presidential spending authority.

Court orders?

Aggressive litigation.

Iran?

Traditional Article II military authority.

Crypto and foreign business?

Lawful private enterprise.

Prosecutions?

Legitimate law enforcement.

Press restrictions?

Management of White House access.

Universities?

Federal civil-rights enforcement.

Taken individually, each explanation deserves consideration.

But impeachment historically concerns abuse of office, and abuse of office can involve patterns.

Congress therefore has another legitimate question to ask:

Do these episodes remain independent constitutional disputes, or does the evidence collectively demonstrate a presidency attempting to subordinate institutions that were designed to constrain presidential power?

That is not a rhetorical question.

It is the question an impeachment inquiry would have to investigate.

WHAT AN ACTUAL IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY SHOULD ESTABLISH

A responsible impeachment case should not begin with “Trump must be impeached” and then search for evidence.

It should proceed in the opposite direction.

Congress should obtain documents.

Subpoena relevant records where legally appropriate.

Take testimony under oath.

Determine who issued disputed directives.

Establish whether career officials objected.

Examine whether presidential orders departed from normal governmental procedures.

Compare treatment of political opponents with treatment of allies.

Establish financial connections where conflicts are alleged.

Determine whether court orders were knowingly disregarded or instead challenged through lawful appellate procedures.

Determine whether congressional spending restrictions were deliberately circumvented.

Establish what Trump personally knew and directed.

Then Congress can decide what those facts mean.

That is the difference between constitutional accountability and political theater.

THE CASE FOR A THIRD IMPEACHMENT

So, after eight previous installments, does a constitutional case exist for considering a third impeachment?

There is substantial documented material that could support a formal congressional inquiry into whether presidential powers have been abused.

That is narrower than saying the evidence already establishes every proposed article of impeachment.

It does not.

Some allegations remain disputed.

Some involve unresolved litigation.

Some involve constitutional powers presidents of both parties have asserted.

Some require evidence of intent that is not presently available publicly.

Some may prove lawful.

Others may not.

The House possesses the constitutional authority to investigate those questions and decide whether particular conduct satisfies the impeachment standard. The Senate, if articles were approved, would then possess the sole authority to conduct a trial, with conviction requiring two-thirds of senators present (U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2–3).

That process—not an essay, political rally, social-media campaign or presidential declaration—is where the constitutional judgment belongs.

THE COST OF NO ACCOUNTABILITY

There is one final question before this series reaches its conclusion next week.

What happens if Congress decides that none of this is worth investigating?

Not that Trump is innocent after investigation.

Not that evidence fails to support impeachment.

Not that particular presidential actions are constitutionally lawful.

What happens if Congress simply chooses not to determine the answers?

Then uncertainty itself becomes precedent.

Future presidents will know that appropriated money may potentially be withheld while Congress argues.

Federal funding may potentially be attached to presidential priorities Congress never authorized.

Military force may potentially be initiated without congressional approval.

Businesses connected to presidents may potentially receive enormous financial benefits while those presidents make policies affecting the same industries and foreign governments.

Federal investigative machinery may potentially be directed toward presidential enemies so long as retaliatory intent remains difficult to prove.

Press organizations, universities and law firms may potentially face governmental consequences during conflicts with the president.

Perhaps each action is lawful.

Perhaps some are not.

But constitutional boundaries do not maintain themselves.

Congress was given impeachment authority because the Framers understood that ordinary elections, ordinary criminal prosecutions and ordinary litigation might not always be sufficient to protect the republic from abuses by its highest officers (Constitution Annotated, 2026).

That does not mean Congress must impeach Donald Trump.

It means Congress must decide what conduct it is willing to permit presidents to repeat.

Because whatever constitutional authority Congress allows this president to establish will not disappear when Donald Trump eventually leaves office.

The next president will inherit it.

So will the president after that.

And that brings us to the final installment.

The ultimate question is no longer merely what Donald Trump has done.

It is what kind of presidency the United States intends to leave behind.

REFERENCES

Constitution Annotated. (2026). Historical background on impeachable offenses. Congress.gov, Library of Congress.

Constitution Annotated. (2026). Overview of impeachment. Congress.gov, Library of Congress.

Constitution Annotated. (2026). Overview of impeachment trials. Congress.gov, Library of Congress.

Constitution Annotated. (2026). President Donald Trump and impeachable offenses. Congress.gov, Library of Congress.

Reuters. (2026a, September 26). Trump seeks to withhold $800 million in Congress-approved funds.

Reuters. (2026b, September 28). Judge blocks Trump from tying anti-terrorism grants to election changes.

Reuters. (2026c, September 29). Supreme Court lets Trump resume deporting migrants to countries not their own.

U.S. Constitution, art. I, §§ 2–3; art. II, § 4.

U.S. House of Representatives. (2025a). H.Res. 353, Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors. 119th Congress.

U.S. House of Representatives. (2025b). H.Res. 537, Impeaching Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes and misdemeanors. 119th Congress.

U.S. House of Representatives. (2026). Congressional Record, January 15, 2026: Remarks concerning H.Res. 939.