When Provocation Becomes Routine

Russia, China and the Gray-Zone Trap

By Cliff Potts, Editor-in-Chief, WPS News

BAYBAY CITY, LEYTE, Philippines — Monday, September 14, 2026 — 1635 PHT

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REPORTING

RUSSIA KEEPS APPROACHING THE LINE

On September 9, Moldovan authorities reported that two Russian drones entered their airspace during Russian attacks against Ukraine. One crashed in Moldova and caused a fire. The second continued into Romania, a NATO member (Reuters, 2026a).

Four days later, a Russian drone struck a Ukrainian passenger train approximately 2 kilometers from the Polish border. A train carrying former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt and other European figures had traveled the same route shortly beforehand. Another Russian strike hit a truck less than 1 kilometer from Poland and temporarily disrupted the Dorohusk-Yahodyn border crossing (Reuters, 2026b).

Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski described Russia’s increasing attacks near NATO territory as “an escalation” (Reuters, 2026b).

Reuters reported on September 10 that British, Norwegian and U.S. forces had confronted a covert Russian undersea exercise near Svalbard earlier in 2026. According to two Western officials speaking anonymously to Reuters, units associated with Russia’s GUGI deep-sea warfare directorate were simulating the deployment of technology that could disable critical undersea communications cables during a future conflict with NATO (McFarlane & Slattery, 2026).

No cable was attacked or damaged, and Reuters did not report that an actual sabotage operation against the cables was underway. Allied forces tracked and confronted the Russian vessels, which left before completing the exercise (McFarlane & Slattery, 2026).

The distinction is important. The incident represents reported preparation or rehearsal for a capability that could potentially be used against NATO infrastructure—not a confirmed Russian attempt to cut Svalbard’s cables that NATO stopped in progress.

Some U.S. intelligence analysts reportedly fear Russia could eventually attempt to test NATO’s Article 5 commitment, with attacks against subsea infrastructure representing one possible method (McFarlane & Slattery, 2026).

NATO has not said a Russian conventional attack is imminent, and there has been no invocation of Article 5.

WHEN EVEN BIRDS TRIGGER FIGHTER JETS

On September 13, Lithuania temporarily closed Vilnius Airport after radar detected objects officials feared might be drones.

NATO dispatched an Italian fighter operating under its Baltic Air Defence mission.

The objects turned out to be birds.

The airport reopened 38 minutes later (Reuters, 2026c).

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has said Russia has become “increasingly reckless,” citing airspace incursions, drones, missiles and malign activity directed against alliance territory. NATO has also described the attempted attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport as a Russian hybrid attack and pledged continued protection of critical infrastructure (NATO, 2026).

THE WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

The Philippines continues facing repeated confrontations with China in the West Philippine Sea.

China continues rejecting the 2016 international arbitral ruling that invalidated Beijing’s expansive South China Sea claims. Philippine government vessels, Filipino fishermen and Chinese coast guard ships have repeatedly encountered one another around disputed maritime features.

In July, the Philippine military accused Chinese coast guard personnel of repeatedly striking a Filipino sailor in the head with a wooden baton during a confrontation at a disputed shoal.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. rejected describing such behavior simply as gray-zone activity.

“This is not gray zone anymore,” Teodoro said. “This is actual coercion, bullying and aggression” (Associated Press, 2026).

ANALYSIS

WHEN THE EXTRAORDINARY BECOMES ORDINARY

The most dangerous military provocation may eventually be the one nobody considers particularly unusual anymore.

That is becoming the problem on NATO’s eastern frontier, and the Philippines already has years of experience with the same psychological danger in the West Philippine Sea.

The situations are not identical.

Russia is conducting a full-scale conventional war against Ukraine. China and the Philippines are not at war. NATO is a multinational military alliance. The Philippines is confronting Chinese pressure primarily through maritime law enforcement, military deterrence and international partnerships.

But Russia and China share one important characteristic in these two theaters: both repeatedly apply pressure while attempting to remain below the threshold that would provoke a much larger military response.

That creates a normalization problem.

The first drone entering foreign airspace creates international headlines.

The tenth becomes another air-defense incident.

The first aggressive maritime interception generates outrage.

After years of confrontations, another Chinese vessel blocking, ramming or intimidating a Philippine ship can disappear into the weekly situation report.

That does not make the behavior less serious.

It means people have become accustomed to it.

THE GRAY-ZONE TRAP

“Gray-zone warfare” is a useful analytical term. It describes coercive behavior deliberately designed to remain below the level traditionally associated with open warfare.

It can also become dangerously comforting language.

Ships are still rammed.

Sailors are still injured.

Airspace is still violated.

Communications infrastructure can still be threatened.

Governments still have to decide whether each incident represents an accident, deliberate intimidation, reconnaissance, preparation, sabotage or something larger.

The reported Svalbard exercise illustrates the problem particularly well. No cable was cut. No sabotage attack occurred. But if Western intelligence assessments are correct, Russian forces were practicing a capability that could be used against NATO communications infrastructure during a future confrontation.

Preparation is not the same as attack.

It is also not meaningless.

Russia benefits when NATO has to debate the significance of every drone, covert exercise, cable incident or intelligence warning.

China benefits when every confrontation in the West Philippine Sea becomes just another episode in a dispute the world has learned to ignore.

The common strategy is not necessarily to trigger war.

It is to alter what everyone considers normal.

THE NORMALIZATION TRAP

Eventually, governments and populations stop measuring danger against peace.

They measure it against yesterday.

If yesterday included three incursions and today includes only two, today begins to look calm.

That is how coercion becomes institutionalized.

Neither NATO nor the Philippines should respond recklessly. Restraint remains essential, particularly when nuclear powers and treaty alliances are involved.

But restraint is not acceptance.

A Russian drone entering NATO airspace remains a Russian drone entering NATO airspace.

Military preparation involving technology capable of disabling undersea communications infrastructure remains relevant even when no cable is actually attacked.

Chinese coercion in the West Philippine Sea remains coercion regardless of how many times it has happened before.

Russia and China are different governments pursuing different objectives.

Both, however, benefit when repeated aggressive or coercive behavior becomes background noise.

The world should be extremely careful about allowing that to happen.

History rarely announces the moment when abnormal behavior has been tolerated long enough to become the new normal.

Usually, people recognize that moment only after the consequences arrive.

References

Associated Press. (2026, September 10). War of words between China and Philippines over South China Sea claims.

McFarlane, S., & Slattery, G. (2026, September 10). NATO allies foil Russian subsea cable sabotage plot. Reuters.

NATO. (2026, September 2). Remarks by the NATO secretary general with the president of the European Commission.

NATO. (2026, September 10). Remarks by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul.

Reuters. (2026a, September 9). Drone alert delayed Zelenskiy’s departure for Norway, Moldova says.

Reuters. (2026b, September 13). Russia hits passenger train on Ukraine’s border with Poland, just misses diplomatic train.

Reuters. (2026c, September 13). Lithuania says drone sighting turns out to be flock of birds after NATO summons jets.