NATO Is No Longer Just Scrambling Fighters

Poland Warns Russia May Be Testing the Limits of Article 5

By Cliff Potts, Editor-in-Chief, WPS News

BAYBAY CITY, LEYTE, Philippines — Tuesday, September 22, 2026 — 1635 PHT

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REPORTING

DOCUMENTED DEVELOPMENTS

NATO FIRES OVER LITHUANIA

The situation on NATO’s eastern flank changed materially last week.

Shortly after midnight on Tuesday, September 15, a drone entered Lithuanian airspace from Belarus, a close Russian ally.

The aircraft did not simply cross the border and immediately get destroyed. It penetrated farther into Lithuanian territory before an Italian fighter operating under NATO’s Baltic Air Defence mission intercepted and shot it down near the southern Lithuanian village of Pratkūnai, not far from Kaunas (Sytas et al., 2026a).

NATO’s Italian fighters operate from Šiauliai Air Base in northern Lithuania as part of the alliance mission protecting the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Lithuanian authorities initially said the drone carried an explosive. Italian Defense Minister Guido Crosetto said the threat “most probably” originated from Russia, while investigators continued examining the wreckage (Sytas et al., 2026a).

Subsequent investigation provided additional context.

Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda said on September 16 that the aircraft had been identified as a Gerbera, a relatively inexpensive Russian-made long-range drone commonly used as a decoy but also capable of carrying explosives.

Nausėda said Lithuanian authorities believed the drone was most likely intended for Ukraine rather than Lithuania and may have been knocked off course by Ukrainian electronic warfare (Sytas, 2026b).

Lithuanian military specialists continued examining the drone’s electronics to determine its intended destination.

That distinction matters.

There is currently no confirmed evidence that Russia deliberately launched this particular drone against Lithuania.

What is documented is that a Russian-type military drone entered NATO airspace from Belarus, traveled into Lithuania and was destroyed by a NATO fighter over Lithuanian territory.

That represents a more forceful defensive response than the repeated interceptions and fighter scrambles that have characterized previous incursions.

WHAT ARTICLE 5 ACTUALLY MEANS

The destruction of a military drone over Lithuania does not automatically make the incident an Article 5 event.

Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty applies when a NATO member suffers an “armed attack.” NATO itself says whether a particular incident qualifies as an armed attack must be assessed case by case. Significant cyber or hybrid attacks can potentially qualify, but neither a border violation nor the presence of a foreign military object automatically activates collective defense (NATO, 2025a).

Article 4 is different. Any NATO member can invoke Article 4 when it believes its territorial integrity, political independence or security is threatened. That begins consultation among the allies. It does not mean NATO has declared that an armed attack occurred, and it does not constitute a declaration of war (NATO, 2025b).

Even Article 5 is frequently misunderstood.

If an armed attack is determined to have occurred, every NATO member becomes obligated to assist the attacked ally. However, the treaty says each member takes “such action as it deems necessary.” NATO states explicitly that assistance may or may not involve armed force (NATO, 2025a).

Article 5 therefore does not operate like an automatic switch that sends every NATO military directly into combat.

The distinction is especially important in the Lithuanian case because investigators have not established that Lithuania itself was deliberately targeted.

NATO EXPANDS ITS DEFENSIVE POSTURE

NATO’s senior military leadership met in Copenhagen on September 18 and 19.

Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, chair of NATO’s Military Committee, said Russian airspace violations, drone incidents and hybrid activities continue to test alliance defenses.

NATO officials also emphasized protecting undersea cables, energy infrastructure and digital systems as part of deterrence and defense planning (NATO, 2026).

The alliance maintains regional defense plans covering contingencies ranging from limited incursions to collective defense under Article 5.

There has been no Article 5 invocation in connection with the Lithuanian incident.

There has been no sustained direct combat between NATO and Russian forces.

No publicly announced strategic nuclear-alert change has accompanied these developments.

THE UNITED STATES AND POLAND

President Donald Trump has said the United States and Poland are making progress toward establishing a permanent U.S. Army base in Poland.

Polish officials have said discussions continue while the Pentagon separately reviews the broader American military posture in Europe (Raufoglu, 2026).

No final agreement establishing such a base had been announced when the reporting was published.

If completed, however, a permanent American installation would increase the enduring U.S. military presence on NATO’s eastern flank.

INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS AND UNCONFIRMED SCENARIOS

POLAND WARNS ABOUT DELIBERATELY DISGUISED ATTACKS

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has warned that intelligence received from Poland’s allies, Ukraine and the United States indicates a risk that drones or other projectiles could enter NATO territory and cause damage.

According to Tusk, one possible scenario is that Russia could conduct an attack and subsequently portray it as accidental in an effort to weaken NATO solidarity or create disagreement over how the alliance should respond (Associated Press, 2026).

This is an intelligence warning.

It is not confirmation that Moscow has ordered such an attack.

No publicly released evidence establishes that Russia has made a decision to execute that specific scenario.

But the Article 5 distinction explains why such a strategy could be attractive.

If an obvious Russian missile attack deliberately destroyed a NATO military installation, the alliance would face a comparatively straightforward question about whether an armed attack had occurred.

An unidentified drone crossing a border, an explosion whose perpetrator cannot immediately be established or a projectile Moscow insists was accidentally diverted creates a much more complicated problem.

NATO governments must first determine what happened, who was responsible and whether the incident reached the threshold of an armed attack.

Ambiguity buys time.

It can also create disagreement.

The Lithuanian incident demonstrates exactly why that distinction is difficult.

A military drone crossed NATO territory.

NATO shot it down.

Yet Lithuania’s own president subsequently said the available evidence suggested that Lithuania itself probably was not the intended target.

EUROPEAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES DISCUSS POSSIBLE TESTS

European intelligence officials are also publicly discussing whether Russia could attempt a more serious test of NATO during the coming months.

The Guardian reported that several intelligence chiefs consider possibilities including sabotage, false-flag operations, missile or drone incidents, or a limited incursion (Walker, 2026).

These possibilities remain assessments rather than confirmed Russian operational plans.

Officials from Baltic states have also cautioned against interpreting those warnings as evidence that a conventional Russian attack on NATO is imminent.

Russia remains heavily engaged in Ukraine, and intelligence assessments differ regarding what Moscow may be willing or able to attempt elsewhere.

Officials nevertheless expect Russian sabotage and other hybrid activity in Europe to remain a significant security problem (Walker, 2026).

ANALYSIS

WHAT HAS ACTUALLY CHANGED

The distinction between documented events and possible future threats is essential.

A NATO fighter really did shoot down a military drone over Lithuania.

The drone really did enter Lithuanian territory from Belarus.

But the available Lithuanian assessment does not establish that Lithuania was deliberately attacked.

That geographic and operational distinction matters.

This was not a confirmed Russian strike directed against a Lithuanian target.

It entered from Belarus and appears, according to Lithuania’s president, more likely to have been associated with the continuing Russia-Ukraine war before deviating from its intended route.

That makes the incident fundamentally different from the kind of deliberate armed attack Article 5 was designed to address.

It does not make the incident irrelevant.

NATO still had to detect the aircraft, identify a threat, scramble forces and ultimately destroy it over alliance territory.

The United States and Poland are also discussing a potentially permanent American military presence, while European governments are increasingly preparing for drones, sabotage and other ambiguous threats.

Those developments require no speculation.

What remains uncertain is whether Russia intends to deliberately stage an attack against NATO territory while disguising it as an accident, whether Moscow intends to test Article 5 in the coming months, or whether any particular future drone or missile incursion would represent a deliberate Russian decision.

Those are possibilities being discussed by governments and intelligence services.

They are not established facts.

THE NORMALIZATION PROBLEM REMAINS

Months ago, NATO aircraft were repeatedly scrambling when suspicious objects approached or entered alliance airspace.

Now a NATO fighter has destroyed a military drone over alliance territory.

That progression deserves attention even without assuming the worst possible explanation.

Repeated incidents also create a dangerous psychological effect.

The first incursion produces headlines.

The fifth becomes another military statement.

Eventually, the public can begin treating drone incursions, fighter launches, sabotage investigations and border closures as routine features of European life.

That is precisely why the difference between a confirmed threat and a speculative one must remain clear.

Overstating intelligence warnings creates unnecessary alarm.

Understating documented incidents creates complacency.

Both mistakes are dangerous.

Europe is not presently in a NATO-Russia war.

Article 5 has not been invoked.

An airspace incursion alone does not automatically trigger it.

Article 4 consultations, if requested, would likewise represent political and security consultations—not the beginning of war.

There is no confirmed evidence that Russia has ordered an imminent conventional attack on NATO.

But NATO forces are now taking increasingly active defensive measures, governments are publicly discussing scenarios that once would have sounded extraordinary, and intelligence services are watching closely for attempts to exploit precisely the ambiguity between an alarming incident and an armed attack.

People should understand both halves of that picture.

The documented developments are serious enough without presenting speculation as certainty.

And the speculative threats are important enough that they should not be ignored simply because they have not yet happened.

References

Associated Press. (2026, September 18). Poland warns Russia is planning drone or rocket strikes on NATO territory.

NATO. (2025a). Collective defence and Article 5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO. (2025b). The consultation process and Article 4. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

NATO. (2026, September 19). NATO Chiefs of Defence meet for the Military Committee Conference in Copenhagen.

Raufoglu, A. (2026, September 18). U.S., Poland making progress on permanent American Army base, Trump says. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Sytas, A., Balmforth, T., & Laizans, J. (2026a, September 15). Italian NATO jet downs suspected Russian drone over Lithuania. Reuters.

Sytas, A. (2026b, September 16). Drone shot down in Lithuania was likely aimed at Ukraine, Lithuanian president says. Reuters.

Walker, S. (2026, September 20). Baltic spy chiefs warn Moscow is preparing for more decisive action in Europe. The Guardian.